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I. INTRODUCTION
The Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of selected state and
federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law from the year 2005. They are neither
comprehensive in breadth (several cases are omitted) nor in depth (many issues within
individual cases are omitted). Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an
authoritative guide; rather, they are intended to alert the Alaska legal community about
judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries are grouped by subject matter.
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Ninth Circuit
Yakutat, Inc. v. Gutierrez
In Yakutat, Inc. v. Gutierrez,1 the Ninth Circuit held that a regulation setting
qualifying years for the purpose of awarding fishing licenses was neither arbitrary nor
capricious and was supported by a rational basis.2 Yakutat challenged the licensing
program of the National Marine Fisheries Service in district court on the grounds that
exclusion of 1999 as a qualifying year was unfair, inequitable, and lacked a rational
basis.3 The district court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment, and
Yakutat appealed.4 The Ninth Circuit held that because the Secretary based the
regulation on various reports and public comments, it was not arbitrary or capricious.5
Further, the Secretary’s decision to place a higher premium on historical participation
when limiting entry of newer fishing vessels was a rational basis for the regulation.6 The
Ninth Circuit held that a National Marine Fisheries Service regulation that sets qualifying
years for the purpose of awarding fishing licenses was valid because it was neither
arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by a rational basis.7
Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Forest Service
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Forest Service,8 the Ninth Circuit
held that the U.S. Forest Service’s adoption of a logging plan based on an error in market
demand projection was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”)9 and misleading and inadequate in violation of the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)10.11 In revising the land management plan for a
forest, the Forest Service misinterpreted market demand projections for timber.12 As a
result, the Forest Service included in its Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) a
projection that was nearly double the true number and adopted a logging plan using these
incorrect numbers.13 The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) challenged the
1
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plan as arbitrary and capricious and the EIS as misleading and inadequate.14 The district
court held for the Forest Service, concluding that the error was insignificant, and NRDC
appealed.15 The Ninth Circuit held that the Forest Service’s adoption of the plan was an
arbitrary and capricious action in violation of the APA because the plan’s adoption ran
counter to the evidence and the Forest Service failed to show that the mistake was a
harmless error.16 The Ninth Circuit also held that the EIS violated NEPA by misleading
the public about the economic effects of the plan,17 failing to consider alternatives based
on correct market demand projections when the Forest Service was aware of the error,18
and inadequately assessing the cumulative impact of past and reasonably foreseeable
future non-federal logging.19 The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the
Forest Service’s projection error rendered its plan arbitrary and capricious in violation of
the APA and its EIS misleading and inadequate in violation of NEPA.20
Alaska Department of Health & Social Services v. Centers For Medicare & Medicaid
Services
In Alaska Department of Health & Social Services v. Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services,21 the Ninth Circuit held that the Administrator of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) acted permissibly in denying the State of
Alaska’s proposed amendment to alter federal reimbursement rates to Indian tribal health
facilities.22 The State petitioned for judicial review on the grounds that the decision was
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.23 The Ninth Circuit
found that an agency rule is arbitrary and capricious if it relies on factors which Congress
did not intend it to consider, fails to consider important aspects of the problem, acts
inconsistently with the evidence before it, or is entirely implausible given agency
expertise.24 Here, the court held that CMS did not act arbitrarily or capriciously because
the agency denied the State’s proposal on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the
statutory requirement of efficiency, economy, and quality of care and it failed to comply
with statutory upper payment limit regulations.25 Thus, the court denied judicial review
of the CMS Administrator’s final judgment denying the program amendments.26
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Alaska Supreme Court
Grunert v. Alaska
In Grunert v. Alaska,27 the supreme court invalidated a regulation that created a
cooperative fishery and allocated a quota of salmon to the fishery.28 Grunert, a
fisherman, challenged the regulation, claiming that it exceeded the authority of the
Alaska Board of Fishery, conflicted with the statutory definition of “fishery,” was
inconsistent with the act’s purpose and policy, and was unconstitutional.29 The superior
court granted the State's motion for summary judgment upholding the validity and
constitutionality of the regulation, and Grunert appealed.30 The supreme court held that
the regulation was invalid because it transformed the limited entry permit from a personal
gear license into an ownership share in the cooperative fishery.31 The supreme court
further held that the regulation contradicted the statutory definition of "fishery" by
allocating the same resources to both a cooperative and an open fishery using the same
type of gear in the same area.32 The supreme court reversed the superior court's grant of
summary judgment, finding the regulation creating a cooperative fishery invalid, and
remanded the case.33
Vroman v. City of Soldotna
In Vroman v. City of Soldotna,34 the supreme court held that the de facto officer
doctrine can confer validity on an improperly selected arbitrator when the arbitration is
part of a municipal grievance procedure and not a collective bargaining agreement.35
After Vroman was fired from the police department, he requested arbitration of his
grievance regarding the termination.36 Due to the unavailability of one of the original
arbitrators, the mayor selected an alternate arbitrator but failed to get city counsel
confirmation, as required by municipal code.37 Vroman challenged the arbitration based
on the procedural defect but the superior court denied the challenge.38 Vroman
appealed.39 The supreme court held that Vroman did not waive his right to challenge the
alternative arbitrator’s participation because he did not have a knowing intent to
relinquish a right or privilege when he failed to object to the arbitrator’s presence during
27
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arbitration.40 However, the supreme court held that the de facto officer doctrine — which
confers validity on acts by officers with defects in their title — barred Vroman from
arguing the arbitrator’s participation because the alternate had colorable authority due to
his appointment by the mayor.41 Moreover, the court held there was no indication that
the original arbitration was unfair, and the arbitration was conducted on a municipal code
provision and therefore did not violate private contract law.42
Fuller v. City of Homer
In Fuller v. City of Homer,43 the supreme court held that a city is permitted to
charge a fee for producing public documents but not for conducting a privilege review of
the documents.44 Fuller requested documents concerning an annexation of land from the
City of Homer.45 The city charged Fuller a fee for the production including time spent by
the city manager for a privilege review.46 Fuller appealed the superior court's granting of
summary judgment to the city and its dismissal of her complaint.47 She claimed error in
the determination that the city was entitled to charge a fee for the privilege review and
that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the time spent on the review
and the amount charged for it.48 The supreme court held that under relevant state statutes
and city code provisions, the city was entitled to charge a fee for ministerial tasks related
to the production of public records but that privilege review was not such a task and
therefore could not be included in the fee determination.49 The supreme court reversed
the order of summary judgment and remanded for recalculation of the appropriate fee.50
Carlson v. Renkes
In Carlson v. Renkes,51 the supreme court held that: 1) when an administrative
agency issues a final decision, it must give notice of the 30-day appeal period52 and 2)
that the loss of an administrative record alone was not a violation of due process.53 After
an administrative hearing, the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) transferred Carlson, a
prisoner, to Arizona.54 Carlson objected and filed a pro se complaint in the superior court
40
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claiming due process violations and requesting a reparative injunction.55 The superior
court granted the State’s motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim, holding that
Carlson was required to bring his claim as an administrative appeal, not a civil action,
and that he lost the ability to do so because the thirty-day appeal period had passed.56
Carlson appealed, arguing that the court erred in characterizing his complaint as an
administrative appeal and that the loss of an audio tape of his hearing was a violation of
due process.57 The supreme court held the superior court’s treatment of the complaints as
an administrative action was not in error because the statute Carlson sued under merely
contained definitions and not a cause of action.58 However, the supreme court found that
the superior court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint because the DOC did
not notify Carlson of his thirty-day limit for appeal.59 Although the supreme court held
that the loss of the hearing’s audio tape was not a violation of due process, it ordered that
the superior court try to recreate Carlson’s administrative record on remand.60 The
supreme court vacated the order dismissing Carlson’s claim on the grounds that he was
not properly notified of his thirty-day time limit and remanded with the stipulation that
the superior court recreate his administrative record.61
Conkey v. State of Alaska, Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles
In Conkey v. State of Alaska, Department of Administration, Division of Motor
Vehicles,62 the supreme court held that riding a towed snowmobile with limited steering
ability constitutes operating a motor vehicle under Alaska law.63 Conkey was arrested for
driving while intoxicated while riding on a towed snowmobile.64 The departmental
hearing officer found by a preponderance of the evidence that there was probable cause to
arrest Conkey for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and
imposed a three-year revocation of Conkey’s driver’s license.65 After the superior court
affirmed the departmental officer’s findings, Conkey appealed, claiming that a
snowmobile was not legally a motor vehicle and, in addition, he was not operating it
when he was arrested. 66 The supreme court affirmed the departmental and superior
court’s rulings that a towed snowmobile is a motor vehicle and Conkey’s limited steering
of the towed snowmobile involved exercising control over the vehicle, which constitutes
operating the vehicle.67
55
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State, Department of Health & Social Services v. Valley Hospital Ass’n, Inc.
In State, Department of Health & Social Services v. Valley Hospital Ass’n, Inc.,68
the supreme court found that a state agency’s determination of rates owed by a hospital
was arbitrary and capricious.69 The Alaska Department of Health and Social Services
(“DHSS”), retroactively and without prior notice, enacted a deadline for the submission
of information to be used in setting Medicaid reimbursement rates.70 Even though DHSS
had an accurate report of Valley Hospital’s Medicaid costs, the department refused to
accept the report under the new deadline rule and instead relied on cost information that it
knew to be inaccurate.71 The superior court found the rate set by DHSS to be improper.72
The supreme court affirmed, finding that DHSS’s reasons for using the erroneous data, in
these circumstances, were so insubstantial as to constitute an abuse of discretion.73 The
court also found that DHSS should be left to determine a reasonable way to re-calculate
the rate on its own.74
George Easley Co. v. Estate of John Lindekugel
In George Easley Co. v. Estate of John Lindekugel,75 the supreme court held that
the Alaska Worker's Compensation Board did not err in finding a company liable for an
employee's injuries under the last injurious exposure rule and denying the company's
requests for offsets to the award.76 John Lindekugel suffered a work-related injury in
1976 that resulted in a permanent disability classification.77 In 1981, after being cleared
to work, Lindekugel suffered another work-related injury while employed by the George
Easley Co.78 The Worker's Compensation Board found Easley liable under the last
injurious exposure rule which required that: (1) the employment related to the second
injury aggravated or accelerated the first injury and (2) the employment was a legal cause
or substantial factor in the disability.79 The board also denied Easley's petitions to offset
the award based on Lindekugel's social security benefits, his settlement with his first
employer, and his legal malpractice settlement.80 The superior court affirmed the board's
findings, and Easley appealed.81 The supreme court held that in workers’ compensation
cases, there is a presumption of compensability when the employee has presented some
68
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evidence that work related activities could have aggravated or caused the employee's
injuries.82 To rebut that presumption, Easley would have to show that the injury was not
caused by activities related to Lindekugel’s work at Easley or that there was no
possibility of the employment causing the disability.83 The supreme court held that the
medical evidence presented by Easley was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of
compensability.84 The supreme court also held that Easley was not entitled to offsets
relating to the earlier employment and legal malpractice settlements because they were
related to questions of law and not of fact.85 The supreme court further held that while
the offset relating to social security benefits did involve a question of fact, the Worker's
Compensation Board did not abuse its discretion in deciding Easley was not entitled to
the offset.86 The supreme court affirmed the decisions of the superior court and the
Worker's Compensation Board holding that Easley was liable under the last injurious
exposure rule and that it was not entitled to offsets due to the previous employment and
legal malpractice settlements or the social security payments.87
Laidlaw Transit, Inc. v. Anchorage School District
In Laidlaw Transit, Inc. v. Anchorage School District,88 the supreme court held
that a transportation company’s action against a school district and another transportation
company was properly treated as an administrative appeal;89 that the district’s
proceedings complied with due process;90 and that there was a reasonable basis for
finding that it was in the school district’s best interest to award the transportation contract
to another company.91 Laidlaw Transit and First Student, transportation companies, bid
on a contract with Anchorage School District.92 After First Student offered to match
Laidlaw’s low proposal, the school district held a hearing to determine which
transportation company would be in the district’s best interests.93 When the district chose
to give the contract to First Student, Laidlaw sued, alleging fraud and miscalculation.94
The trial court converted this civil action to an administrative appeal and affirmed the
board’s decision.95 Laidlaw appealed.96 The supreme court held that Laidlaw’s action
was properly characterized as an administrative appeal since it was a challenge to the
82
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board’s decision.97 Moreover, the court held that Laidlaw’s due process rights were not
violated because the board hearing was not meant to resolve competing property interests
and the board was not required to hear unlimited testimony or grant cross-examinations.98
Finally, the court held that the board’s determination of best interest was reasonable
because there was substantial evidence supporting the decision and the board had
extensive discretion to award or not award the contract to any bidder.99 Thus, the
supreme court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.100
Lindhag v. State, Department of Natural Resources
In Lindhag v. State, Department of Natural Resources,101 the supreme court held
that the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Board’s (“the Board’s”) denial of benefits to an
employee was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board did not abuse its
discretion in denying the employee’s petition for modification.102 Lindhag quit her job
after her personal doctor advised her that the building she worked in was either
exacerbating or causing a medical condition.103 The Board agreed to pay Lindhag
benefits for some symptoms but not for others, based largely on the findings of a Boardappointed physician.104 After acquiring new evidence about her condition, Lindhag filed
a petition for reconsideration, which the Board denied.105 The supreme court upheld the
Board’s decision to deny benefits because the Board’s determination was supported by
substantial evidence.106 The court specifically found the Board, which had the sole
power to determine witness credibility, had properly accorded more weight to the
findings of the Board-appointed physician than Lindhag’s personal physician.107 Further,
the court held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Lindhag’s petition for
rehearing and modification because the post-hearing evidence was presented without due
diligence108 and failed to offer any evidence of a change in her condition.109 The supreme
court thus affirmed the superior court’s decision to uphold the Board’s orders, holding
that the partial denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence and that the
denial of the petition for rehearing was not in error.110
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III. BUSINESS LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Brown v. Dick
In Brown v. Dick,111 the supreme court held that inadvertent violations of
proxy disclosure requirements resulting from good-faith reliance on expert advice did
not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty and did not per se require an award of
nominal damages.112 A group of dissident shareholders led by Brown complained of
proxy violations in voting related to a controversial land transaction.113 A consent
decree entered by the Alaska Department of Community and Economic
Development’s Division of Banking, Securities, and Corporations, confirmed that
certain alleged proxy violations did occur but were inadvertent.114 Brown claimed
that the violations amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty and that he was entitled to
nominal damages.115 The superior court found no breach of fiduciary duty because
the violations were based on good-faith reliance on expert advice and denied nominal
damages.116 The supreme court held that the superior court did not abuse its
discretion in denying nominal damages where the violations were inadvertent and
based on good-faith reliance on expert advice.117
Harris v. Ahtna, Inc.
In Harris v. Ahtna, Inc.,118 the supreme court held that a buy-or-sell contract
between two shareholders did not comply with a shareholder agreement requiring such
contracts to state an equal monetary price.119 Under a shareholder agreement between
Harris and Ahtna Inc. (“Ahtna”), each party could make a special offer to sell, forcing the
other shareholder to either buy the offeror’s shares at the offered price or sell his own
shares at the same price.120 Ahtna made such an offer, providing a price per share as well
as two other conditions, which required assumption of debt.121 Harris agreed only to the
price term, claiming that the debt assumption conditions were invalid under the
agreement.122 Ahtna claimed that this response obligated Harris to sell his shares.123 The
111
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superior court issued a partial final judgment requiring Harris to sell his shares to
Ahtna.124 Harris appealed, arguing that the two assumption of debt terms violated the
shareholder agreement because they constituted non-monetary price conditions that
created price inequality depending on which shareholder was the seller, and that he was
entitled to specific performance to buy the shares based on the price term agreement.125
The supreme court held that the buy-or-sell contract could not contain non-monetary
conditions and that there must be price equality regardless of who buys or sells.126
However, Harris’ acceptance of the price term alone did not create an enforceable
contract allowing specific performance because Ahtna’s offer was merely conditional.127
The supreme court reversed the partial final judgment and remanded the case, holding
that the buy-or-sell contract violated the agreement’s requirement of equal price and
preclusion of non-monetary conditions and that Harris was not entitled to specific
performance.128
Deaver v. Auction Block Co.
In Deaver v. Auction Block Co.,129 the supreme court held that a fish auctioneer
who issued a fisherman a fish ticket was the primary fish buyer.130 Deaver, a commercial
fisherman, received a fish ticket from Auction Block in return for his catch.131 The ticket
listed Auction Block as the buyer and specified the price of the catch, but Auction Block
paid Deaver less than the specified price.132 Deaver filed suit for breach of contract and
the superior court dismissed his claims, finding that Auction Block was merely an
auctioneer and not a buyer.133 The supreme court held that because Auction Block issued
its own fish ticket to Deaver, it was the buyer of the fish.134 The court reasoned that a
primary fish buyer who is the initial recipient of fish cannot avoid its statutory duty under
state law to post surety bond to secure payment to fishers simply because it had a
contractual duty to act as an auctioneer.135 Also, because Auction Block accepted the fish
within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code, it was contractually bound to pay
Deaver the specified amount.136 The supreme court reversed and remanded the case for
123
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further proceedings on Deaver’s breach of contract claim, holding that Auction Block
was the primary fish buyer.137
Hall v. TWS, Inc.
In Hall v. TWS, Inc.,138 the supreme court held that a creditor could foreclose on
its interest in a business venture because it was not a tenancy in partnership.139 Hall and
Moore purchased a mining operation together.140 Hall subsequently filed for
bankruptcy.141 After that, Moore’s interest was assigned to TWS, and TWS moved to
foreclose on its interest.142 The supreme court held that, although a partnership was
formed, the subsequent bankruptcy dissolved the partnership, making the mining
operation a tenancy in common.143 Moreover, no new partnership agreement was formed
after the bankruptcy.144 Thus, the supreme court held that the business venture was a
tenancy in common rather than a tenancy in partnership and TWS could foreclose on its
interest.145
OK Lumber Co. v. Alaska Railroad Corp.
In OK Lumber Co. v. Alaska Railroad Corp.146, the supreme court held that an
arbitrator’s ruling on the fair market value of land was within the scope of arbitration.147
OK Lumber leased land from the Alaska Railroad Corporation with the rent tied to the
fair market value of the property.148 The parties agreed to arbitrate disputes as to the fair
market value of the property. 149 OK Lumber argued that the arbitrator exceeded his
authority when he added a factor to the determination of fair market value that was not in
the contract.150 The supreme court held that the language of the contract allowed the
arbitrator to arbitrate any disagreement over fair market value and further held that
arbitrators’ findings of facts are unreviewable, even in the case of gross error.151 The
supreme court therefore affirmed the superior court’s decision to uphold the arbitrator’s
determination.152
137
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IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
Alaska Supreme Court
Catalina Yachts v. Pierce
In Catalina Yachts v. Pierce,153 the supreme court held that a sailboat seller was
entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs incurred when its pre-trial settlement offer was
rejected and the jury returned a judgment less favorable to the offeree.154 The Pierces
bought a new sailboat from Catalina Yachts and sued when Catalina refused to replace
the damaged hull under the warranty.155 While the jury found in favor of the Pierces, the
total of the jury award plus attorneys’ fees and costs was less than Catalina’s pre-trial
offer, which the Pierces had rejected.156 Catalina then filed a motion for post-offer fees
under Alaska Civil Rule 68.157 The superior court denied this motion and a motion for
reconsideration, holding that Rule 68 did not apply because it was preempted by federal
law.158 Catalina appealed.159 The supreme court held that the Rule 68 requirement that
an offeree pay attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by the offeror when the offeree receives
a judgment that is less favorable than the pre-trial offer is mandatory and is not
conditioned on any other rule.160 In addition, the court held that Rule 68 is not in conflict
with the federal law and does not hinder its purpose.161 The supreme court reversed and
remanded the case to determine the fees and costs to which Catalina was entitled.162
Morgan v. Fortis Benefits Insurance Co.
In Morgan v. Fortis Benefits Insurance Co.,163 the supreme court held that the
trial court properly granted summary judgment for an insurer on the basis that a
decedent’s death fell under her policy’s intoxication exclusion.164 The decedent was
driving with a blood alcohol level well above the legal limit, when her car ran off the
road causing her death.165 The insurer, Fortis, claimed that the decedent’s death fell
under the policy’s intoxication exclusion, because the death was caused either directly or
153
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indirectly by the decedent’s intoxication.166 The trial court granted summary judgment
for Fortis.167 On appeal, the supreme court held that summary judgment was properly
granted because the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence
was that the decedent’s accident and death were at least indirectly caused by her
intoxication.168 The supreme court applied the standard of construing grants of insurance
coverage broadly, and exclusions narrowly, in favor of the insured.169 Thus, the supreme
court affirmed the superior court, holding that the policy’s intoxication exclusion
applied.170
Phillips v. Gieringer
In Phillips v. Gieringer,171 the supreme court held that notice of a complaint and
knowledge of a mistake made on a complaint may be imputed to a defendant through the
defendant’s insurance company.172 Phillips filed a suit against Carl Gieringer after the
two were involved in an automobile accident but mistakenly identified Carl’s father,
Robert Gieringer, as the defendant.173 Phillips amended the complaint to properly
identify Carl as the defendant after the statute of limitations had run, prompting the
superior court to dismiss the complaint. 174 The supreme court held that because Carl and
Robert shared the same insurance plan and Phillips had sent the insurance company a
copy of the complaint, there was a presumption that notice was imputed to Carl.175
Moreover, the supreme court held that the insurance company knew or should have
known that Phillips meant to identify Carl as the defendant.176 Thus, the supreme court
reversed the superior court’s dismissal of the complaint.177
Kaiser v. Umialik Insurance
In Kaiser v. Umialik Insurance,178 the supreme court held that improperly asserted
equitable estoppel and equitable tolling arguments do not remedy a claim filed after the
statute of limitations had run.179 On appeal from the denial of a bad faith claim against an
insurer, Kaiser claimed that equitable estoppel or equitable tolling allowed him to file a
166

Id. at 269.
Id.
168
Id. at 270–71
169
Id. at 270.
170
Id. at 271.
171
108 P.3d 889 (Alaska 2005).
172
Id. at 891.
173
Id. at 890.
174
Id.at 890–91.
175
Id.at 895.
176
Id.at 896.
177
Id. at 895–96.
178
108 P.3d 876 (Alaska 2005).
179
Id. at 878–79.
167

14

claim after the statute of limitations had run.180 In affirming the lower court’s ruling, the
supreme court held that Kaiser had waived his claim to equitable estoppel because he did
not raise the issue in the superior court181 and dismissed the claim of equitable tolling
because Kaiser did not undergo any extraordinary circumstances that would justify the
claim.182
DeNardo v. Calista Corp.
In DeNardo v. Calista Corp.,183 the supreme court held that where a stipulated
dismissal preserved a plaintiff’s claims, neither res judicata nor the doctrine against claim
splitting barred a subsequent action.184 DeNardo filed lawsuits in state and federal court
against Calista based on the same facts.185 The state court lawsuit was removed to federal
court and consolidated with the federal court lawsuit.186 The state claims were then
remanded and subsequently voluntarily dismissed by the parties.187 The federal court
then dismissed the federal court claims.188 DeNardo then filed a third lawsuit in superior
court based on the same facts as alleged in the first state lawsuit.189 The superior court
dismissed the claims, relying on res judicata and the doctrine against claim splitting, and
DeNardo appealed.190 The supreme court held that res judicata based on stipulated
dismissal does not bar causes of actions expressly reserved for future adjudication.191
Here, the dismissal of the state claims alleged to be with prejudice were actually without
prejudice because they expressly preserved all claims pending in federal court (which
were included in the state lawsuit).192 The court also found that the federal court
dismissal did not rule on the merits of the non-federal claims and therefore did not
preclude claims brought in the third lawsuit.193 The claim splitting argument was also
rejected because the third lawsuit raised only claims that were brought up in the first state
action.194 Therefore, the court vacated the order dismissing the complaint and remanded
the case, holding that the claims in DeNardo’s third lawsuit were not barred.195
180

Id. at 880.
Id. at 881.
182
Id. at 881–82.
183
111 P.3d 326 (Alaska 2005).
184
Id. at 328.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 329.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 332.
192
Id. at 333–34.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 335.
195
Id.
181

15

Monzingo v. Alaska Air Group
In Monzingo v. Alaska Air Group,196 the supreme court held that a non-prevailing
plaintiff filing a class-action suit is not liable for attorneys’ fees solely related to class
certification and notice.197 Monzingo sued Alaska Airlines based on an individual claim
and elected to be the named plaintiff in a class action claim.198 The supreme court held
that a non-prevailing plaintiff should only pay attorneys’ fees related to the individual
merits of his or her own claim and not fees related to a class action.199 The court further
held that allowing the threat of additional liability for attorneys’ fees would hamper the
policy behind Rule 82 by discouraging plaintiffs from acting as class representatives.200
Thus, the policy behind Rule 82 does not support imposing attorneys’ fees on a named
plaintiff when those fees involve class action preparation that falls outside the substantive
merits of the plaintiff’s individual case.201 Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s grant of summary judgment but vacated the fee award and remanded for
a determination of the appropriate award.202
Rockstad v. Erikson
In Rockstad v. Erikson,203 the supreme court upheld the trial court’s summary
judgment decisions and its decisions on damages but vacated an award of attorneys’ fees
and costs incurred in litigation outside the province of the state court.204 A jury found
Rockstad liable for failure to repay a loan that was secured by a note and a deed of trust
on his home.205 Rockstad appealed the superior court’s ruling on his statute of limitations
and usury defenses,206 its decision to allow judicial foreclosure of his house, and its
award of attorneys’ fees.207 The supreme court held that there is no mandatory obligation
to grant summary judgment even when such a motion is unopposed because undisputed
facts could oppose the motion.208 The court also held that the statue of limitations
determination could not be appealed because Rockstad introduced evidence during trial
that defeated his statute of limitations claim.209 With respect to the superior court’s
ruling on Rockstad’s usury defense, the supreme court held that there was no violation of
the usury statute because the plain language of the loan note indicated that there was only
196
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one loan for $26,000, which is above the $25,000 limit established in the statute.210
Considering the five factors of quasi-estoppel, the court concluded that judicial
foreclosure was appropriate because the doctrine of quasi-estoppel applied to enforce the
deed of trust.211 Finally, the court held that the trial court’s award to Erikson of full
attorneys’ fees was appropriate because it was pursuant to the terms of the note and
deed.212 However, the award cannot include attorneys’ fees incurred in Rockstad’s
bankruptcy litigation because it was outside the province of the state court and solely in
the power of the federal bankruptcy court to make such an award.213
In the Matter of Kristine A. Schmidt
In In the Matter of Kristine A. Schmidt,214 the supreme court held that an order
assessing attorneys’ fees and costs may be upheld where it explains the basis for the
sanction, even if it does not cite a violation of a specific rule in the Alaska Rules of Civil
Procedure.215 The superior court issued an order granting Schmidt’s motion to accept a
late-filed brief and directing her to pay attorneys’ fees for the opposing party’s reply brief
and then issued a subsequent order again denying the motion and ordering her to pay
additional attorneys’ fees.216 Schmidt appealed, arguing that the superior court must
specify a violation of a Rule of Civil Procedure before awarding attorneys’ fees.217
Moreover, she argued that she did not violate any Rule, and that she did not receive
notice before being fined for the late brief.218 The supreme court held that an order
assessing attorney’s fees may be upheld even if it does not cite a Rule of Civil Procedure
violated if the basis for the sanction is still discernible from the order.219 Moreover,
Schmidt violated Rules that require litigants to follow court-set deadlines, and any notice
deficiency was cured by her opportunity to move for reconsideration.220 However, the
supreme court held that the superior court abused its discretion in issuing the second
order because it did not explain its change in course from the first order.221 The supreme
court thus affirmed the superior court’s first order and vacated the second, holding that an
order assessing attorneys’ fees and costs may be upheld where it explains the basis for the
sanction.222
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Crumpler v. State
In Crumpler v. State,223 the supreme court held that modification of a child
support obligation should be retroactive to the date a parent was served with the
modification.224 When notice of modification of child support sent to Crumpler was
returned as undeliverable, the Child Support Enforcement Division resent the notice to
Crumpler’s new address. 225 The superior court held that a state civil rule requires such
orders to be effective as of the filing date of the motion.226 On appeal, the supreme court
affirmed the modification of child support,227 holding that the superior court did not
abuse its discretion, that Crumpler was properly served notice, and he had further an
obligation to notify the court of his change of address.228
Wendell C. II v. State of Alaska, OCS
In Wendell C. II v. State of Alaska, OCS,229 the supreme court held that a superior
court decision may be upheld even if the superior court improperly considered evidence
if there was no reasonable likelihood that exclusion of the evidence would have affected
the decision.230 The superior court terminated plaintiffs’ parental rights, citing extrarecord social science studies in making two of its findings.231 Plaintiffs appealed, arguing
that the superior court improperly considered evidence outside of the record.232 The
supreme court held that there was no reasonable likelihood that the decision to terminate
plaintiff’s parental rights would have been different without the studies, because other
admissible evidence was sufficient to establish the two challenged findings.233 The
supreme court thus affirmed the termination of parental rights, holding that a superior
court decision may be upheld despite improper consideration of evidence if there was no
reasonable likelihood that the decision would have been different without the
consideration.234
Hymes v. Deramus
In Hymes v. Deramus,235 the supreme court held that the superior court
improperly denied a continuance in a lawsuit against medical personnel associated with
223
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the prison system.236 Hymes and his wife sued medical personnel associated with the
Alaska Department of Corrections.237 The defendants moved for summary judgment, and
the superior court issued an order stating that if the couple did not submit “an expert
affidavit” supporting their position, summary judgment would be granted.238 The
Hymeses later requested a continuance, which was denied, and the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment was granted.239 On appeal, the supreme court reversed the
summary judgment, holding that the Hymeses met the three requirements to receive a
continuance: (1) they unambiguously requested relief; (2) they were not dilatory during
discovery; and (3) they adequately demonstrated why extra time was needed.240
Owen M. v. State
In Owen M. v. State,241 the supreme court affirmed the denial of an evidentiary
hearing when an appeal was filed after the statute of limitations on the claim had run.242
The superior court terminated Owen M.’s parental rights and declined to place the child
with a family member other than Owen M.’s parents.243 Owen M. appealed, and he
argued that the court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing and by not placing the
child with his parents.244 The supreme court affirmed the superior court, finding that an
evidentiary hearing was not required because it was not required by the statute covering
parental termination proceedings.245 Moreover, it held that because Owen M.’s appeal of
his child’s placement was filed after the statute of limitations had run, it was invalid.246
Snyder v. American Legion Spenard Post No. 28
In Snyder v. American Legion Spenard Post No. 28,247 the supreme court affirmed
the superior court’s grant of summary judgment based on discovery sanctions imposed as
a result of the appellant’s failure to appear at trial.248 The superior court imposed
discovery sanctions, leading to summary judgment.249 Snyder appealed both the grant of
summary judgment motion and denial of motion for relief, arguing that (1) he was denied
due process by the imposition of litigation ending sanctions and (2) his failure to appear
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at trial was excusable neglect due to lack of service and pro se ineptitude.250 The
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s holding that an appellate court may affirm a
judgment on any ground supported by the record whether or not it was relied upon by the
trial court and that here summary judgment can be grounded on Snyder’s non-appearance
at trial.251 The supreme court also affirmed the denial of Snyder’s motion for relief
because Snyder was not denied due process and did not show excusable neglect.252
Marron v. Stromstad
In Marron v. Stromstad,253 the supreme court held that the superior court did not
abuse its discretion regarding a series of discovery, evidentiary, and procedural
decisions.254 Stromstad rear-ended Marron’s car, and Marron sued Stromstad for
negligence.255 The jury found for Stromstad, and Marron appealed several evidentiary
and procedural decisions.256 Marron first challenged the admission of the testimony of
three experts for failing to meet the federal Daubert standard.257 The supreme court
declined to extend the Daubert analysis to non-scientific expert testimony and rejected
Marron’s argument.258 Specifically, the court held that a treating physician testifying
about the course of treatment used is not subject to the Daubert analysis.259 Marron also
challenged the admission of one of the physicians because of failure to provide an expert
report.260 The supreme court held that treating physicians need not be listed as experts
and therefore their testimony was admissible without the expert disclosure
requirement.261 In addition, Marron challenged the superior court’s denial of her motion
for a new trial.262 The supreme court held that a party requesting a new trial has the
burden of proving both error and prejudice, and neither occurred in this case.263 Finally,
the supreme court held that the superior court improperly awarded attorneys’ fees to a
party who has not itemized his or her fees, when such itemization was requested by the
opposing party.264 The supreme court affirmed all superior court decisions except the
award of attorneys’ fees, which it remanded.265
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Gilbert v. Sperbeck
In Gilbert v. Sperbeck,266 the supreme court held that a psychologist could not be
sued for fraud and misrepresentation during arbitration testimony.267 Further, he had
witness immunity, and thus could not be sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”).268 During arbitration regarding an automobile accident in which Gilbert was
involved, Sperbeck, the insurance company’s psychologist, testified that a personality
disorder caused Gilbert to over-report her pain.269 The arbitrator ruled against Gilbert
and she filed suit against Sperbeck, claiming he was fraudulent, misrepresented her
injuries, and violated the ADA by not providing her with an appropriate chair during their
interview.270 The superior court granted Sperbeck’s motion for summary judgment and
Gilbert appealed.271 The supreme court held that Gilbert’s claims of fraud and
misrepresentation were barred because public policy extends witness immunity to
arbitration proceedings.272 The court also held that the ADA could not provide the relief
sought because Title III only allows monetary damages if the United States Attorney
General requests them, which he had not.273 Finally, the court held that Gilbert waived
any statutory claims by failing to cite authority or advance a legal theory on which to
base such claims.274 The supreme court therefore affirmed the judgment of the superior
court entering summary judgment against Gilbert.275
Sengupta v. Wickwire
In Sengupta v. Wickwire,276 the supreme court held that an attorney was not liable
for malpractice.277 Wickwire represented Sengupta, a professor at the University of
Alaska at Fairbanks, who was terminated for cause.278 After the superior court affirmed
the termination, Wickwire agreed to appeal only the issue of whether Sengupta was
entitled to a hearing before faculty prior to termination, and the appeal was denied
because it was filed late.279 Sengupta then sued the University for various violations of
his constitutional rights and lost in both the superior and supreme courts.280 He then sued
Wickwire for malpractice for (1) failing to raise a First Amendment claim of retaliation
266
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for exercising the right to free speech at the grievance hearings and (2) filing the untimely
appeal.281 The superior court granted summary judgment for Wickwire, which Sengupta
appealed.282 The supreme court held: (1) Wickwire could not have raised the First
Amendment claim at the grievance hearings since Sengupta had not been terminated at
that time, and (2) Sengupta was not injured by the untimely appeal because Wickwire
agreed to limit the scope of the appeal to only one issue, on which Sengupta could not
have prevailed as it was subsequently decided against him by the supreme court.283 The
supreme court thus affirmed the superior court’s order granting summary judgment to
Wickwire.284

Cikan v. Arco Alaska, Inc.
In Cikan v. Arco Alaska, Inc.,285 the supreme court held that a woman had
presented enough evidence of her own incompetence to prevent dismissing her action as
time-barred.286 Cikan slipped and fell outside of ARCO’s offices and suffered a
concussion.287 Following her injury, Cikan did not file a suit against ARCO until after
the statute of limitations had expired.288 The superior court granted ARCO summary
judgment on the ground that Cikan’s claim was time barred due to the expiration of the
statute of limitations and lack of persuasive evidence indicating incompetence.289 The
supreme court noted Cikan had presented more than a “scintilla” of evidence of her
incompetence,290 which justified an evidentiary hearing by the superior court to resolve
ARCO’s statute of limitations defense.291 The supreme court reversed the superior
court’s ruling and remanded the case for review.292
John v. Baker
In John v. Baker,293 the supreme court held that tribal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with state courts regarding Alaska Natives child custody issues, but tribal
courts do not have jurisdiction over child support determinations.294 John and Baker,
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both Alaska Natives, separated and later disagreed on the custody of their children.295
Baker petitioned for custody in tribal court, which awarded shared custody and told the
parties not to seek child support.296 Dissatisfied, Baker filed a new custody and child
support petition with the superior court.297 John challenged, claiming that the tribal court
had jurisdiction and had decided the custody and child support issues.298 After a series of
jurisdictional disputes, the superior court concluded that tribal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over child support.299 The supreme court held that the child support and child
custody matters were separate.300 Since the superior court had jurisdiction over child
support, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision that the division has
authority to enforce the superior court’s child support order.301
Polar Supply Co. v. Steelmaster Industries
In Polar Supply Co. v. Steelmaster Industries, 302 the supreme court held that
Alaska courts had personal jurisdiction over a Canadian supplier because the supplier had
sufficient minimum contacts under Alaska’s long arm statute and jurisdiction comported
with fair play and substantial justice.303 Steelmaster Industries, a Canadian company,
entered into a contract with Polar Supply Co., knowing that it was an Alaska corporation
and that it planned to use the equipment in Alaska.304 When Polar sued Steelmaster in
superior court, Steelmaster argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction, and the
superior court agreed.305 The supreme court held that the superior court did have
personal jurisdiction because Steelmaster had sufficient minimal contacts with Alaska, as
evidenced by the fact that it knowingly and directly negotiated and dealt with an Alaska
corporation.306 Moreover, Steelmaster could have reasonably anticipated a possible
lawsuit in Alaska,307 and the inconvenience to Steelmaster was minimal, so exercise of
jurisdiction comported with fair play and substantial justice.308 Thus, the supreme court
reversed the superior court’s order dismissing the case because Alaska courts could
exercise personal jurisdiction over Steelmaster.309
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Ninth Circuit
United States v. Combs
In United States v. Combs,310 the Ninth Circuit held that police officers who did
not physically knock on a door before executing a search warrant acted reasonably and
thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment.311 When the police executed a search
warrant on Combs’ house, they saw smoke and flames indicating methamphetamine
cooking.312 After thirty to sixty seconds, during which the police announced themselves
over a public address system, they entered the house without knocking.313 Combs was
convicted of various drug-related crimes and he appealed, arguing evidence from the
house should have been suppressed because the police failed to knock on his door before
entering.314 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that although officers generally should “knock
and announce,” their method of entry is part of a “totality of the circumstances”
reasonableness inquiry, in which a literal knock is not always required.315 Because the
police announced their presence to the extent possible here, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
Combs’ conviction, holding that the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because they had acted reasonably in executing the search warrant.316
Turney v. Pugh
In Turney v. Pugh,317 the Ninth Circuit held that Alaska’s jury tampering statute
did not violate the First Amendment.318 Before jury selection at a criminal trial, Turney
approached potential jurors and handed them a number to a phone line that encouraged
jury nullification.319 One juror called the line and then changed his vote, preventing the
jury from reaching a decision.320 The jury was excused and Turney was indicted for jury
tampering under Alaska Statute section 11.56.590.321 He was found guilty and his
conviction was upheld by the supreme court, and he filed a writ of habeas corpus in
district court, challenging the jury tampering statute on First and Sixth Amendment
310
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grounds.322 The district court dismissed the writ, but the Ninth Circuit granted a
certificate of appealability to determine whether the statute is overbroad.323 The court
held that section 11.56.590 was not overbroad because its focus is limited to the narrow
category of communications aimed at improperly influencing the outcome of a specific
case. 324 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that Alaska’s jury
tampering statute was not overbroad.325
United States v. Dorsey
In United States v. Dorsey,326 the Ninth Circuit upheld a conviction because the
arrest, search, and trial statements were permissible and because the modern Gun-Free
School Zones Act327 (“the Act”) is constitutional, but remanded for reconsideration of the
sentence because the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) are now
advisory.328 Dorsey was arrested after police stopped him for driving recklessly and
found cocaine and a handgun in his car.329 He pled guilty to several drug and firearm
offenses, including a violation of the Act and was sentenced to ninety-eight months
imprisonment under the Guidelines, which were mandatory at the time.330 He appealed
his conviction and sentence.331 The Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction because there
was probable cause for the arrest, the resulting search of Dorsey’s car was proper, and a
trial statement was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted.332 The Ninth Circuit also held that the Act is constitutional under the
Commerce Clause because it contains a proper jurisdictional element.333 However, the
Ninth Circuit held that Dorsey’s sentence was plain error because the Guidelines are no
longer mandatory.334 The Ninth Circuit affirmed Dorsey’s conviction because his arrest,
search, and trial were all proper and the Act is constitutional and then remanded for
reconsideration of the sentence.335
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Osborne v. District Attorney’s Office
In Osborne v. District Attorney’s Office,336 the Ninth Circuit held that a §1983
claim should not have been dismissed because its success did not “necessarily imply” the
invalidity of the underlying conviction.337 Osborne had been sentenced to prison for
kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault.338 The District Attorney’s Office denied him
post-conviction access to biological evidence that he hoped to subject to new methods of
DNA analysis, and Osborne filed a §1983 action, alleging violations of his federal
constitutional rights.339 The district court dismissed the claim, ruling that his action
would impermissibly “set the stage” to invalidate his underlying conviction.340 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the correct test is whether Osborne’s claim
“necessarily implies” that his conviction is invalid.341 Applying this test, the court
concluded that mere access to the DNA evidence does not “necessarily imply” the
invalidity of Osborne’s underlying conviction.342 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court, holding that Osborne’s §1983 action should be allowed to proceed.343

Alaska Supreme Court
Lawson v. Lawson
In Lawson v. Lawson,344 the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of Alaska
Civil Rule 90.3 because previous evaluation of the rule already established its
constitutionality.345 At trial, Lee Lawson moved to be excused from paying child support
to his wife, Valerie, arguing that the “best interests of the child” provisions of Rule 90.3
were unconstitutional.346 The court denied his motion and Lee appealed.347 The supreme
court held that Rule 90.3 (1) was neither vague nor overbroad, (2) did not violate equal
protection, (3) did not violate the Fourth Amendment, (4) did not violate the Fifth
Amendment, (5) did not violate the Alaska Constitution’s right to privacy, and (6) did not
violate the doctrine of separation of powers.348 The supreme court thus affirmed the
superior court’s order on the grounds that Rule 90.3 was constitutional.349
336
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State, Division of Elections v. Metcalfe
In State, Division of Elections v. Metcalfe,350 the supreme court held the
legislature did not act unreasonably by requiring a political party to receive three percent
of the vote in the previous gubernatorial election to appear on the ballot or by requiring
an individual to collect signatures of voters equal to one percent of the voters in the
previous gubernatorial election to appear on the ballot.351 Metcalfe, a political candidate
seeking placement on the ballot, was denied ballot access by statute because his political
party failed to receive three percent in the last gubernatorial election; he also did not
submit signatures equal to one percent of the voters in the last gubernatorial election.352
Metcalfe brought suit, claiming violations of the free speech and equal protection
provisions of the Alaska Constitution353 and received a preliminary injunction from the
superior court.354 The supreme court reversed,355 holding that Metcalfe failed to establish
a clear probability of success on the merits.356 The court held the three percent polling
requirement was not unreasonable, because the figure was in the mainstream of the
practices of other states.357 Moreover, the court found the heightened requirement for
continuing ballot access for a party compared to ballot access for an individual is justified
by the benefits derived from party ballot access.358 Thus, the supreme court found that
ballot access requirements for both political parties and individuals were not
unreasonable,359 reversed the superior court’s order, and vacated the preliminary
injunction.360
State v. Trust the People
In State v. Trust the People,361 the supreme court held that an initiative application
for a proposed bill belonged on the general election ballot.362 Trust the People, an
initiative committee, submitted an application for a proposed bill.363 The state lieutenant
governor denied certification of the initiative based on an opinion by the Department of
Law which stated such an initiative violated the Seventeenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.364 The superior court held a hearing on the denial of certification,
350
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found that certification should have been granted, and ordered the initiative to be
included on the statewide general election ballot.365 The state appealed, arguing that the
proposed initiative was void because it was substantially the same as a bill passed in the
state legislature.366 The supreme court held that the proposed initiative and the bill were
not “substantially the same” because the two had different purposes.367 Moreover, the
supreme court held that because the subject matter of the initiative was not “specifically
barred from the initiative process,” it should have been submitted to voters.368 The
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision and ordered the lieutenant governor
to include the initiative on the general election ballot.369
Larson v. Cooper
In Larson v. Cooper,370 the supreme court affirmed summary judgment dismissing
an inmate’s constitutional tort claim, holding that the uncontested evidence indicated the
prison had legitimate reasons to restrict the inmate’s visitation privileges and the inmate
had failed to offer evidence of retaliatory conduct.371 Larson had his contact-visit
privileges revoked after he refused to stop holding hands with his wife.372 Larson was
subsequently found not guilty on the disciplinary charge of disobeying an officer, and he
appealed to the superior court, alleging the suspension of contact visitation rights was
done to retaliate against him for holding hands with his wife in furtherance of his
religious beliefs and for contesting his disciplinary charges.373 To sustain such a charge,
the court held, Larson had the burden of showing his conduct was constitutionally
protected and the adverse action was prompted by a retaliatory motive.374 Although the
court held that pursuing his grievances was a constitutionally protected activity,375 the
court did not find his acquittal on disciplinary charges dispositive.376 The court upheld
the dismissal on summary judgment, holding that disobedience of a guard’s direct order,
a legitimate reason for punishment, was uncontroverted.377
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State v. Dupier
In State v. Dupier,378 the supreme court held that the state did not exceed its
authority in requiring halibut fishers to possess interim-use permits, that federal law did
not preempt the state’s permit requirements, and that the permit requirements did not
violate the federal constitution.379 After fishing legally in federal waters while in
possession of federal permits, Dupier and two other fishers attempted to land their
catches in Alaska.380 None of the fishers had obtained state permits, nor had they
attempted to fish in state waters.381 The state prosecuted them for their lack of valid
interim-use state permits.382 The superior court found the state had encroached upon
federal law and dismissed the charges.383 The court of appeals affirmed.384 The supreme
court reversed, finding that interim-use permits were freely available,385 halibut fishery
management was not the exclusive jurisdiction of federal law,386 and the state’s permit
requirements did not actually conflict with federal law.387
State, Division of Elections v. Green Party of Alaska
In State, Division of Elections v. Green Party of Alaska,388 the supreme court held
that state election law requiring each political party to have its own primary ballot
violated the Alaska Constitution because it substantially burdened a party’s association
rights and the state’s justification for imposing the burden was insufficient.389 Under
Alaska Statute section 15.25.060(a),390 political parties were required to have their own
ballet containing only their candidates in primary elections.391 The Green Party of Alaska
and the Moderate Republican Party were accordingly denied the ability to form a joint
ballot and challenged the law, claiming the law violated their constitutional rights.392 The
court first determined the parties’ rights had been burdened because the right to decide
who can participate in selecting its candidates is of central importance to the right of
association.393 The court further determined this burden was substantial because it did
not allow parties to appeal to voters unwilling to limit their political choices to one
378
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party.394 Finally, the court determined the state’s justifications for the restrictions were
either too abstract or not narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.395 Therefore, the
court held the prohibition on combined ballots under section 15.25.060(a) violated the
Alaska Constitution.396
Casciola v. F.S. Air Service, Inc
In Casciola v. F.S. Air Service, Inc.,397 the supreme court held that an award of
punitive damages that was ten times more than actual damages did not violate due
process.398 F.S. Air Service contracted with Casciola for jet engines and paid him a
deposit.399 Casciola misrepresented his ability to provide jet engines, did not provide the
engines, and refused to return the deposit.400 F.S. Air Service brought suit, and the
superior court awarded $30,000 in actual damages and $300,000 in punitive damages.401
Casciola appealed. 402 The supreme court held that the punitive damages award did not
violate state or federal due process because a large award is necessary to deter this type of
fraud and because Alaska law gives notice that a high ratio between actual and punitive
damages was possible for extremely reprehensible conduct.403 The supreme court thus
held that the punitive damages award did not violate Casciola’s due process rights and
affirmed the judgment of the superior court.404
Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State
In Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State,405 the supreme court held that spousal
limitations in benefits paid to public employees violated the equal protection clause of the
state constitution as applied to employees with same-sex domestic partners.406 The State
of Alaska and the Municipality of Anchorage paid benefits to the spouses of public
employees.407 The Alaska Civil Liberties Union and eighteen individuals filed suit
claiming the benefits violated equal protection.408 The superior court granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.409 The supreme court found on appeal that
394
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opposite-sex couples have the opportunity to gain the benefits by marrying while samesex couples never have the opportunity to receive the benefits.410 Applying the slidingscale analysis, the court held that the benefits program did not meet minimum scrutiny
because the denial of benefits to same-sex couples is not substantially related to the
legitimate government interests of cost control, administrative efficiency, and promotion
of marriage.411 The supreme court vacated the superior court’s judgment, holding that
the spousal employee benefits program violated equal protection under the state
constitution.412
Alaska Court of Appeals
Anderson v. State
In Anderson v. State,413 the court of appeals held that the Confrontation Clause of
the United States Constitution does not bar the admission of an out-of-court statement
made by an injured person at the scene of a crime.414 An officer responded to a 9-1-1 call
and found an injured man lying on the ground.415 The officer asked the man what
happened, and the man responded Anderson had hit him with a pipe.416 At trial, the
injured man’s statement was presented to the jury through the officer’s hearsay
testimony.417 The court of appeals ruled that the out-of-court statement did not amount to
a “testimonial” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. 418 Hence, the court of appeals
affirmed the superior court’s admission of the evidence,419 holding that the injured man’s
statement was not inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.420
Osborne v. State
In Osborne v. State,421 the court of appeals held that a felon did not establish a
prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the lower court should
reconsider its decision on whether to allow further DNA testing.422 Osborne was
convicted of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault, based in part on a DNA test.423 He
filed an application for post-conviction relief, claiming his counsel provided ineffective
410
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assistance.424 The superior court denied this application, and Osborne appealed.425 The
court of appeals held that Osborne did not establish a prima facie case of ineffective
assistance of counsel because his attorney’s tactical decision to use a less discriminating
test was objectively reasonable.426 The court ruled that state due process required a
defendant seeking post-conviction DNA testing to meet a three-part test: (1) the
conviction rested primarily on eyewitness identification evidence, (2) there was a
demonstrable doubt concerning the defendant’s identification as the perpetrator, and (3)
scientific testing would likely be conclusive on the issue.427 The court of appeals
affirmed the ruling that Osborne did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel but
remanded, directing the superior court to apply the three-part test to determine whether to
allow further DNA testing.428
Milligrock v. State
In Milligrock v. State,429 the court of appeals held that consideration of three
aggravating factors at sentencing did not violate a felon’s right to jury trial because two
were based on his prior convictions and the third was undisputed.430 Milligrock, who had
two past felony convictions, was convicted of assaulting his girlfriend.431 The superior
court judge enhanced his sentence based on three aggravating factors.432 Milligrock
appealed, claiming that the enhanced sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial.433 The court of appeals upheld the judge’s finding of the first two aggravating
factors because they were expressly exempted as being based on past convictions.434 The
court upheld the ruling on the last aggravating factor because the evidence was
undisputed.435 The court of appeals affirmed the sentence, holding that consideration of
three aggravating factors in sentencing did not violate Milligrock’s right to a jury trial.436
Crane v. State
In Crane v. State,437 the court of appeals held that there is no distinction between
“counselors at law” and “attorneys” and that Alaska attorneys are validly licensed by the
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supreme court and the Alaska Bar.438 Defendant Crane asserted that he was being
deprived of the assistance of counsel because “attorneys” did not qualify as “counsel.”439
The district court ruled that there was no difference, and Crane appealed, arguing that
attorneys are not “counsel” for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment and that there have
been no properly admitted attorneys in Alaska since the legislature withdrew the right of
the Alaska Bar and supreme court to certify legal practitioners in 1976.440 The court of
appeals held that modern attorneys are authorized to perform the duties of both
“attorney” and “counselor” and thus qualify as “counsel.”441 Also, attorneys since 1976
have been validly licensed because the power to admit practitioners remains with the
judicial branch, and the 1976 legislature granted the Alaska Bar’s Board of Governors
authority to certify legal practitioners.442 The court of appeals affirmed the district
court’s judgment, holding that attorneys qualify as “counsel” and that attorneys are
properly certified and admitted by the supreme court and the Alaska Bar.443
State v. Kalmakoff
In State v. Kalmakoff,444 the court of appeals held that the Blakely445 rule does not
apply to the Alaska juvenile waiver procedure.446 Kalmakoff was indicted as an adult
after the superior court granted the state’s petition to waive juvenile jurisdiction for him
because he failed to establish in a waiver hearing that he was amenable to treatment as a
juvenile.447 Kalmakoff moved to return jurisdiction to the juvenile court, arguing that the
juvenile waiver procedure violates the Blakely rule that any disputed fact that increases
the penalty of a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.448 The superior court granted the motion, and the state petitioned for
review.449 The court of appeals held that Blakely’s reasoning does not apply to juvenile
waiver proceedings because they are not sentencing proceedings but determinations of
jurisdiction.450 The court of appeals reversed the lower court order, holding that the
Blakely rule does not apply to the Alaska juvenile waiver procedure.451
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VI. CRIMINAL LAW
Ninth Circuit
United States v. Combs
In United States v. Combs,452 the Ninth Circuit held that entry into a dwelling to
execute a search warrant is not a per se Fourth Amendment violation because of a law
enforcement official’s failure to knock.453 Combs was convicted of manufacturing
methamphetamines after Anchorage police discovered a production facility in his
home.454 He appealed on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that evidence should have
been suppressed because the police failed to knock before entering his house.455 The
Ninth Circuit held that determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred
requires an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances. 456 Since officers had reason to
be concerned for their safety and because they announced their presence to the extent
possible under the circumstances, the court held that their actions were reasonable despite
the absence of an actual knock.457 Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Combs’s
conviction.458
United States v. Cruz
In United States v. Cruz,459 the Ninth Circuit held United States v. Booker460 does
not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.461 Cruz was convicted and
sentenced based on judge-found facts.462 After her sentence was final, she collaterally
attacked it claiming a Sixth Amendment violation as outlined in Booker.463 The Ninth
Circuit joined every other circuit in holding that Booker does not meet any Teague464
exceptions and therefore does not apply retroactively.465 The court affirmed the district
court’s denial of Cruz’s petition.466
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United States v. Henry
In United States v. Henry,467 the Ninth Circuit held that a search of a criminal
defendant’s property was valid because he did not have control over the property and
consented to the search; additionally, it held that the defendant’s guilty plea could not be
retracted post-sentencing.468 Henry was arrested in connection with one crime but was
cleared.469 Before he was released he wanted to retrieve his belongings from the room
where he was initially arrested.470 He was not a guest in the room, but he gave
permission for the search nonetheless.471 Upon searching his belongings, the police
found drugs, and Henry pled guilty to their possession.472 After being sentenced by the
district court, Henry appealed, arguing that because the police improperly searched his
belongings, the drug possession evidence should be excluded and his lawyer thus
improperly advised him to plead guilty.473 The Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments,
stating that the search was proper because Henry gave consent for the search and did not
have a claim to privacy over the room because he was not a guest there.474 It also held
that Henry’s lawyer did not improperly advise him to plead guilty given the totality of the
circumstances.475 The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court on these two
issues but granted a limited remand for Henry to assert Sixth Amendment claims that he
did not originally raise in the district court.476
Alaska Supreme Court
Michael v. State
In Michael v. State,477 the supreme court held that the de novo standard applies in
reviewing a superior court’s application of aggravating and mitigating factors to
particular facts in sentencing.478 After being convicted of first-degree sexual assault,
Michael tried to establish two statutory mitigating factors, that his conduct was among
the least serious in the definition of his offense and that the harm he caused was minor.479
He also argued that a non-statutory mitigating factor, potential for rehabilitation, required
his sentence to be adjusted by a three-judge panel.480 The superior court rejected the
467
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statutory factors, and the court of appeals affirmed under a clearly erroneous standard.481
The superior court also refused to allow a three-judge panel to review sentencing.482 The
supreme court held that the de novo standard applies in reviewing a superior court’s
application of statutory aggravating and mitigating because whether particular conduct
falls within the statutory standard of being among the least serious is a question of law.483
Furthermore, the de novo standard ensures more uniformity in sentencing than a clearly
erroneous standard.484 The supreme court thus remanded for review of the superior
court’s application of the statutory factors under a de novo standard, noting that if the
least-serious factor is still rejected, the case should be referred to a three-judge sentencing
panel to consider the non-statutory factor of rehabilitation potential.485 The supreme
court held that the de novo standard applies in reviewing a superior court’s application of
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors to particular facts.486
Nevers v. State
In Nevers v. State,487 the supreme court held that the exclusionary rule was not
applicable to license revocation proceedings.488 Officers spotted Nevers driving drunk
and attempted to pull him over.489 Nevers stopped his car and fled on foot to evade the
officers but was later caught and arrested in his home for failure to submit to an alcohol
breath test.490 Subsequently, Nevers’ drivers license was revoked.491 Nevers claimed
that officers had no authority to enter his home and that any evidence discovered during
the search was inadmissible.492 Two lower courts ruled that the exclusionary rule does
not apply to license revocation proceedings.493 Nevers appealed to the supreme court.494
The supreme court held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to license
revocation proceedings except where police conduct either shocks the conscience or is
consciously directed toward the unconstitutional arrest of a probationer.495 Because
neither exception was applicable in this case, the supreme court affirmed the ruling of the
superior court and upheld the license revocation.496
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Munson v. State
In Munson v. State,497 the supreme court held that a criminal defendant’s
confession was inadmissible because he had unambiguously invoked his right to remain
silent before he gave the confession.498 Munson was arrested and charged with
murder.499 Early in his interrogation by police, he said, “Well, I’m done talkin’ then.”500
The police officer continued to question Munson, and he confessed to the murder.501 The
superior court suppressed the confession, but the court of appeals reversed, concluding
that Munson’s statement was ambiguous.502 On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that
the statement was sufficiently clear such that a reasonable officer would have understood
it to be an unambiguous invocation of Munson’s right to silence, at which point the
officer was bound to honor the decision.503 The supreme court reversed, holding that
Munson’s confession was inadmissible because he made it after he had unambiguously
invoked his right to remain silent.504
Saltz v. State, Department of Administration
In Saltz v. State, Department of Administration,505 the supreme court upheld the
revocation of a drunk driver’s license.506 After receiving a “Report Every Drunk Driver
Immediately” (“REDDI”) call, a state trooper stopped Saltz as he left a bar in his truck.507
After Saltz failed an alcohol breath test, the officer confiscated his license.508 The
Division of Motor Vehicles held an administrative hearing and revoked Saltz’s license,
finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the truck.509 Saltz appealed the
revocation claiming that his truck did not match the description of the truck provided in
the REDDI call.510 The supreme court held that while Saltz’s truck did not exactly match
the description given in the REDDI call, based on the similarities in color and model and
the proximity in time between the call and the stop, the officer had reasonable suspicion
to stop Saltz’s truck.511 Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the hearing officer’s
findings and upheld the revocation of Saltz’s license.512
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Nevers v. State
In Nevers v. State,513 the supreme court held that the exclusionary rule was not
applicable to license revocation proceedings.514 Officers spotted Nevers driving drunk
and attempted to pull him over.515 Nevers stopped his car and fled on foot to evade the
officers but was later caught and arrested in his home for failure to submit to an alcohol
breath test.516 Subsequently, Nevers’ drivers license was revoked.517 Nevers claimed
that officers had no authority to enter his home and that any evidence discovered during
the search was inadmissible.518 Two lower courts ruled that the exclusionary rule does
not apply to license revocation proceedings.519 Nevers appealed to the supreme court.520
The supreme court held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to license
revocation proceedings except where police conduct either shocks the conscience or is
consciously directed toward the unconstitutional arrest of a probationer.521 Because
neither exception was applicable in this case, the supreme court affirmed the ruling of the
superior court and upheld the license revocation.522
Alaska Court of Appeals
Sergie v. State
In Sergie v. State,523 the court of appeals held that convictions were based on
sufficient evidence, that a trial judge is not required to appoint a new court-appointed
attorney to an indigent client based solely on the client’s refusal to cooperate with the
attorney, and that a conviction for attempted first-degree sexual assault requires the intent
to engage in sexual penetration with reckless disregard for the victim’s consent.524 Sergie
was convicted of attempted first-degree sexual assault, resisting arrest, interfering with a
report of domestic violence, and two counts of fourth-degree assault.525 On appeal,
Sergie argued that his convictions for attempted sexual assault and resisting arrest were
based on insufficient evidence and that the trial court should have discharged his
appointed counsel.526 Sergie further argued that the trial judge should have accepted his
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proposed jury instruction that stated that, in order to convict for first-degree sexual
assault, the jury must have found that Sergie intended the sexual penetration to be nonconsensual.527 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court on all issues, holding that the
convictions were based on sufficient evidence,528 that the trial judge was not required to
discharge Sergie’s court-appointed attorney based solely on Sergie’s refusal to cooperate
with his attorney,529 and that a conviction of attempted first-degree sexual assault requires
only the intent to engage in sexual penetration with reckless disregard for the victim’s
consent.530
Vandergriff v. State
In Vandergriff v. State,531 the court of appeals held that a judge may impose a
consecutive sentence exceeding the maximum term for the defendant’s most serious
offense without submitting the issue to a jury when necessary to protect the public.532
Vandergriff pled guilty to theft, burglary, and forgery, each with a five-year maximum
and a three-year presumptive term.533 The superior court imposed three consecutive
three-year sentences for a composite nine-year sentence, with three years suspended.534
Vandergriff appealed, arguing that Blakely v. Washington535 prevented the judge from
imposing consecutive sentences exceeding the presumptive or maximum term for the
most serious offense.536 The court of appeals held that Blakely does not prevent a judge
from imposing consecutive sentences and does not require a judge to submit the issue to a
jury when the judge finds that a consecutive sentence totaling more than the maximum
sentence for the most serious offense is necessary to protect the public.537 The court also
held that the judge could impose the sentence to protect the public even though the
crimes were not violent, that Vandergriff was not denied a right of confrontation, and that
the sentence was not excessive.538 The court of appeals thus affirmed Vandergriff’s
sentence, holding that a judge may impose a consecutive sentence exceeding the
maximum term for the most serious offense without submitting the issue to a jury when
necessary to protect the public.539
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State v. Gibbs
In State v. Gibbs,540 the court of appeals held that the legality of a first felony
offender’s sentence was not affected by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Blakely v. Washington.541 Gibbs, a first-time offender, received a sentence of six years
imprisonment with three years suspended for second-degree assault.542 Gibbs appealed
her sentence, claiming that it was illegal in light of Blakely, which provides a defendant
the right to have a jury decide factual issues that would increase the defendant’s
sentence.543 The trial court granted her motion to correct her sentence.544 The court of
appeals held that sentencing Gibbs to three years, less than the four-year presumptive
term for second offenders, did not require proof of aggravating factors or extraordinary
circumstances, and, as a result, Blakely did not apply.545 Therefore, the court of appeals
reversed the trial court’s decision on the motion to correct the sentence, holding that
Blakely was inapplicable when the unsuspended portion of a first felony offender’s
sentence did not exceed the second offender’s presumptive term.546
Mooney v. State
In Mooney v. State,547 the court of appeals held that a defendant who brings a
Batson548 challenge must do so before the jury venire is released and the jury is sworn
in.549 In Mooney’s trial for sexual assault, he brought a Batson challenge after the jury
was sworn in, arguing that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges based on race to
exclude Alaska Natives from the jury.550 The court of appeals held that a Batson
challenge cannot be brought after the jury venire is released and the jury is sworn in
because if a challenge is not timely, the prosecutor may have forgotten the reason for
challenging particular jurors and the trial court may not have a reasonable opportunity to
fashion a remedy.551 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed Mooney’s conviction, holding
that in order for a Batson challenge to be timely, it must be made before the jury venire is
dismissed and the jury is sworn in.552
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Dayton v. State
In Dayton v. State,553 the court of appeals held that a first time felony offender
could receive an unsuspended sentence equal to the presumptive sentence for a second
time offender without a showing of aggravating factors.554 Dayton pled no contest to
third-degree assault and was sentenced to four years in prison with two years
suspended.555 He appealed, arguing that in the absence of aggravating factors, a first
felony offender’s time to serve must be more favorable than the presumptive term for a
second felony offender: two years.556 The court of appeals held that aggravating factors
are needed only if the defendant's time to serve exceeds the presumptive term for a
second felony offender convicted of the same crime, because the legislature had
superseded the common law rule.557 The court of appeals affirmed the sentence, holding
that a first felony offender could receive an unsuspended sentence equal to the
presumptive sentence for a second time offender without a showing of aggravating
factors.558
Nease v. State
In Nease v. State,559 the court of appeals held that where a police officer had
probable cause to stop a vehicle, his ulterior motives for the stop were irrelevant for
Fourth Amendment purposes.560 Having suspected Nease of drunk driving earlier in the
day, an officer stopped him for driving with a broken brake light and, upon inspection,
arrested him for driving while intoxicated.561 Nease appealed the admission of evidence
of his intoxication on grounds that the officer used the brake light as a pretext to stop him
for drunk driving.562 The court of appeals held that officers may stop a car regardless of
their subjective intent as long as they are objectively justified based on probable cause
and do not depart from reasonable police practice.563 Since the officer had probable
cause to stop Nease for a traffic violation and did not depart from reasonable police
practice, he was objectively justified.564 Hence, the court of appeals affirmed the
conviction, holding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation.565
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Kenison v. State
In Kenison v. State,566 the court of appeals held that the lower court did not err
when it admitted evidence of a series of harassing behaviors both before and after a
protective order when the violation of the protective order, along with the behavior, were
elements of first-degree stalking.567 Kenison followed, harassed, and repeatedly
contacted his ex-wife over a period of years.568 For part of that time, Kenison’s actions
violated a protective order, giving rise to a charge of first-degree stalking.569 Kenison
argued on appeal both that acts committed prior to the protective order were irrelevant570
and that the jury should have been required to find a “course of conduct” exclusively
during the time covered by the protective order.571 As to irrelevancy, the court of appeals
held that acts committed prior to the protective order were relevant for purposes of
demonstrating fear on the part of the victim, and defendant’s knowledge of the effect of
his acts on the victim.572 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the
evidence could support a jury finding of multiple acts, constituting a course of conduct,
during the period covered by the protective order.573
Hurd v. State
In Hurd v. State,574 the court of appeals upheld a defendant’s third-degree assault
conviction even though the conviction had been previously reversed.575 Hurd was
initially convicted of three felonies: coercion, kidnapping, and third-degree assault.576
The assault charge was later reversed because of merger with the kidnapping charge.577
The kidnapping charge was then reversed on appeal,578 and on remand, Hurd was
sentenced for his assault conviction.579 Hurd appealed, primarily on the ground that his
constitutional protection against double jeopardy was violated by the assault conviction
after that charge had been reversed.580 The court of appeals concluded that the previous
reversal of the assault charge was contingent on the conviction for kidnapping, and
accordingly, the court had authority to sentence Hurd for assault if he was not ultimately
convicted of kidnapping.581 Hurd also argued that he was mistakenly sentenced because
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the judge spoke with the prosecutor out of his presence582 and that his sentence was
overly-severe in comparison to his sentence for kidnapping.583 The court rejected the
former alleged procedural violation as harmless584 and the latter because the assault
sentence was less harsh than his kidnapping sentence.585 Finally, the court of appeals
agreed with the state that Hurd is barred from bringing new challenges to the assault
charge, which were not raised in the first appeal.586 In sum, the court of appeals held that
it was not double jeopardy to reinstate a previously reversed assault conviction when that
reversal was based on merger with, and contingent upon a conviction for, kidnapping,
when the kidnapping conviction was reversed.587
Rodgers v. State
In Rodgers v. State,588 the court of appeals held that a traffic stop that was not
supported by a reasonable suspicion of imminent danger to the public or recent
occurrence of serious harm to persons or property was not legal absent probable cause.589
The district court held that Rodgers’ traffic stop was justified because the officer had an
erroneous but good-faith and reasonable belief that the defendant ran a stop sign.590 The
court of appeals held that the stop did not meet the Coleman v. State591 test, under which
an investigative stop must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of either imminent
danger to the public or recent occurrence of serious harm to persons or property.592 The
court of appeals reasoned Rodgers’ stop would only be legal if the officer had probable
cause to believe he had observed the defendant run the stop sign.593 The court of appeals
could not determine whether the superior court judge used “probable cause” analysis, so
it remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the officer had
probable cause to believe he had seen Rodgers run the stop sign.594
State v. Morgan
In State v. Morgan,595 the court of appeals held that requiring younger offenders
to stay on probation longer does not violate the state equal protection clause.596 Morgan
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was charged with possessing, controlling, or consuming alcoholic beverages by a person
under the age of twenty-one.597 A punishment for this was probation for either one year
or until that person reaches the age of twenty-one, whichever is longer.598 Morgan
moved for dismissal, arguing that the statute violated the state equal protection clause by
requiring younger offenders to stay on probation longer than older offenders.599 The
district court agreed and dismissed the case.600 The court of appeals reversed the district
court’s ruling, holding that requiring younger offenders to stay on probation longer does
not violate the state equal protection clause because there is a substantial relationship
between the legislature’s goal of preventing underage drinking and requiring offenders to
stay on probation until they are twenty-one years old.601
Snyder v. State
In Snyder v. State,602 the court of appeals held that evidence of an alleged assault
victim’s demeanor that was inconsistent with the victim’s testimony was admissible.603
Snyder was charged with sexual assault against M.K.604 Snyder sought to admit evidence
that after the alleged assault, M.K. did not appear to be afraid of or angry with Snyder.605
The trial court excluded the evidence, explaining that it was of little probative value and
posed a danger of unfair prejudice.606 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
evidence should not have been excluded because the State relied on evidence that M.K.
was upset after the assault and ignored Snyder’s theory that M.K. consented.607 The
court of appeals found that the jury should have been allowed to weigh the evidence to
assess M.K.’s credibility.608 Thus, the court found that this was not a harmless error and
reversed Snyder’s conviction, holding that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of
the victim’s demeanor.609
State v. Koen
In State v. Koen,610 the court of appeals held that a warrant application was
defective and insufficient because it did not identify the house that was searched as the
defendant’s residence and did not explain the connection between the premises and the
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evidence being sought.611 After receiving a report that Koen had child pornography on
his computer, an Alaska State Trooper applied for, and obtained, a warrant to search a
specific house.612 The affidavit submitted by the trooper to the magistrate, however, did
not explain how this specific house, Koen, or the claimed child pornography evidence
were connected to the reported crime.613 The superior court held that these omissions
amounted to a fatal flaw in the warrant application and suppressed the evidence that was
obtained under the warrant.614 On appeal, the court of appeals held that while the search
warrant contained adequate information to support a search of the computers at Koen’s
residence, it did not contain information as to where that residence could be located.615
The court further held that while the trooper may have made reasonable inferences about
which house was Koen’s residence, the Fourth Amendment requires a high level of
particularity and that such inferences be explained on the affidavit so that the magistrate
could independently evaluate it.616 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the suppression of
the evidence obtained under the warrant.617
Pilant v. State
In Pilant v. State,618 the court of appeals upheld a jury instruction that allowed
jurors to infer the defendant’s blood alcohol level while driving was at least equal to the
level recorded by a breath test.619 Pilant was arrested for driving under the influence and
submitted to a breath test.620 At trial, the district court gave an instruction allowing, but
not requiring, the jury to infer the test reading was equal to or less than Pilant’s actual
blood-alcohol level while driving.621 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the jury
instruction was proper since the instruction neither created a mandatory presumption nor
inappropriately shifted the burden of proof, but was rather a permissive inference.622

Howell v. State
In Howell v. State,623 the court of appeals held that double jeopardy prevents the
state from appealing an evidentiary ruling that has the effect of an acquittal.624 Howell
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was charged with felony drunk driving based on operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated and prior out-of-state convictions for the same offense.625 The superior court
held that the evidence of prior convictions was insufficient to support the felony
charge.626 The court of appeals denied the state’s cross-appeal, holding that an
evidentiary ruling on a factual element of an offense operates like an acquittal and that
double jeopardy bars the state from appealing the decision.627
Bryant v. State
In Bryant v. State,628 the court of appeals held that a man convicted of sexual
abuse of a minor did not have valid challenges to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings but
remanded the case on his challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel.629 Bryant was
convicted of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor.630 On appeal, Bryant argued that the
lower court improperly denied his motion to present evidence about the victim’s mother’s
prior false claims of sexual abuse631 and improperly admitted plaintiff’s rebuttal evidence
about his character.632 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s evidentiary rulings
as within its discretion633 but remanded the ineffective assistance of counsel claim for
further findings of fact.634
Degrate v. State
In Degrate v. State,635 the court of appeals held that a trial court judge does not
have the authority to order the Department of Corrections to permit a prisoner to serve his
sentence under house arrest and electronic monitoring.636 Degrate was convicted of
second- and third-degree assault and sentenced to seven years in prison.637 Degrate then
filed a motion asking the trial court judge to modify the sentence and order the
Department of Corrections to allow him to serve the sentence under house arrest and
electronic monitoring.638 The judge denied the motion, and Degrate appealed.639 The
court of appeals held that the sentencing judge has statutory authority to recommend
625
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electronic monitoring but not to order the Commissioner of Corrections to impose it.640
The court of appeals thus affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that it
properly denied Degrate's motion.641
Haag v. State
In Haag v. State,642 the court of appeals held that police had justifiable suspicion
to stop a defendant shortly after a robbery, that a line up at which the defendant was
identified was not improperly suggestive, and that the imposition of an aggravating factor
in sentencing constituted plain error.643 Haag was convicted of first-degree robbery,
evidence tampering, and fourth-degree controlled substance misconduct.644 He appealed
his robbery conviction, claiming that he was illegally stopped and unconstitutionally
shown in a line up for identification, and he appealed his sentence based on its
severity.645 The court held that the police conducted an investigative stop with justifiable
suspicion and that the line up was procedurally sound given the timing and circumstances
of the stop.646 The court held that Haag’s sentence was given in error because the trial
court did not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the existence of an aggravating
factor.647 The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, vacated the robbery sentence,
and remanded for re-sentencing.648
Peltola v. State
In Peltola v. State,649 the court of appeals held that an offender’s sentence was
legal because it was within the statutory maximum, and because the offender admitted to
the aggravating factor at issue.650 Peltola pled no contest to bootlegging and was
sentenced within the two-year maximum for his class of felony.651 He appealed the
length of his conviction, arguing that the judge impermissibly used factors not found by a
jury in determining his sentence.652 The court of appeals held that because the sentence
was less than the statutory maximum, any judicial finding of aggravating factors did not
unconstitutionally increase the sentence.653 The court also held that even if the sentence
640

Id.
Id. at 771.
642
117 P.3d 775 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
643
Id. at 777, 785.
644
Id. at 777.
645
Id.
646
Id. at 780–81.
647
Id. at 785.
648
Id.
649
117 P.3d 771 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
650
Id. at 771–73.
651
Id. at 771–72.
652
Id.
653
Id. at 773.
641

47

had exceeded the statutory maximum, it would have been legal because Peltola admitted
the aggravating factor.654
Edmonds v. State
In Edmonds v. State,655 the court of appeals held that the United States Supreme
Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington656 was not violated by a partially consecutive
sentence that exceeded the presumptive term for the defendant’s most serious offense.657
Edmonds received a total sentence of thirty-seven years after the superior court imposed
portions of four twenty-five-year presumptive terms for sexual assault and one fifteenyear presumptive term for attempted sexual assault consecutively.658 Edmonds argued
that Blakely prohibited the superior court from (1) imposing a composite sentence
exceeding fifteen years and (2) imposing consecutive sentences.659 The court of appeals
then rejected both of Edmonds’ arguments, holding that Edmonds’ sentence did not
violate Blakely because (1) none of the sentences exceeded their respective crimes’
presumptive terms and (2) Blakely did not restrict the sentencing judge’s authority to
impose partially consecutive sentences because that authority did not depend on proof of
facts but derived from Alaska law at the time.660 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the
superior court’s decision, holding that Edmonds’ partially consecutive sentence did not
violate Blakely.661
Grohs v. State
In Grohs v. State,662 the court of appeals held that a traffic stop for not having an
illuminated rear license plate was not pretexual and that reliance on prior convictions as
an aggravating factor for increasing a defendant’s maximum sentence without a jury trial
was consistent with Blakely v. Washington.663 Grohs was stopped for not having an
illuminated rear license plate, and he refused to take a breath alcohol test when
subsequently arrested for driving under the influence.664 Grohs was convicted for
refusing the breath test, and the trial judge sentenced him to a term that exceeded the
presumptive term based on the aggravating factor of six similar prior convictions.665
Grohs appealed, claiming that the stop was pretexual and that he had a right to a jury trial
654
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for the extension of his sentence under Blakely.666 The court of appeals held that a stop
for not having an illuminated rear license plate was not pretexual and that the trial court
could rely on prior convictions as the basis for finding an aggravating factor without
requiring a jury trial.667 The court of appeals thus affirmed Grohs’ conviction and
sentence, holding that 1) he failed to show the stop was pretextual and 2) that the
sentence was consistent with Blakely.668
Ned v. State
In Ned v. State,669 the court of appeals held that a violation of a defendant’s right
to have a jury decide certain facts at trial is not grounds for reversal when a judge’s
determination of those facts constitutes harmless error,670 that an increased sentence
cannot be based on an aggravating factor that is already an element supporting the
presumptive sentence,671 and that a defendant is not responsible for every expense related
to the victim’s funeral.672 Ned, driving while intoxicated, had a car accident that killed a
passenger in his car.673 Ned’s intoxication was not disputed at trial.674 At sentencing, the
trial court imposed the presumptive sentence and added three years for the aggravating
factor of using a dangerous instrument, his vehicle, during the crime.675 The trial court
also held Ned liable for the airfare for the victim’s family and friends to attend the
funeral.676 The court of appeals held that, although the jury did not decide the issue of
intoxication, it was harmless error because the facts were overwhelming and not in
dispute.677 However, the court also held that the three additional years added to the
sentence were improperly imposed because they were based on an aggravating factor that
was already an element of the presumptive sentence.678 Finally, as to funeral expenses,
the court held that the scope for criminal restitution is limited to costs proximately caused
by defendant’s actions and therefore did not extend to the travel expenses of distant
relatives and friends.679 The court of appeals thus affirmed Ned’s conviction and upheld
the presumptive sentence but vacated the additional portion of the sentence and the
judgment ordering Ned to pay funeral travel expenses for friends and distant relatives.680
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Grasser v. State
In Grasser v. State,681 the court of appeals held that a sentence requiring a man to
participate in a domestic violence rehabilitation program outside his place of residence
would not impose an unreasonable financial burden.682 Grasser pled guilty to a number
of crimes relating to domestic violence against his girlfriend.683 As part of his sentence,
the district court ordered that Grasser participate in a rehabilitation program, which was
located outside his place of residence.684 Grasser argued participation in the program
would cause an unreasonable financial burden and that the district court lacked the
authority to order that he participate in the program.685 First, the court upheld the
sentence because the district court both offered detailed findings about the reasonableness
of the costs involved and imposed no fine for any of Grasser’s convictions so that he
could devote his money to travel expenses.686 Second, the court held that Grasser was
estopped from arguing that the district court did not have the authority to order the
rehabilitation program because Grasser’s plea agreement explicitly stated the district
court could order his participation in the program.687 The court of appeals affirmed the
district court’s judgment, holding that participation in the rehabilitation program outside
Grasser’s place of residence was not an undue financial burden or an improper
sentence.688
Moore v. State
In Moore v. State,689 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s consent to a
search had been based on a prior illegal search and was thus invalid.690 While on
Moore’s property for unrelated reasons, police noticed that a shack in the backyard
contained a methamphetamine laboratory.691 Prior to obtaining Moore’s consent to
search his house, the police told him that they had already found the backyard lab.692 The
district court found the backyard search to be illegal but found Moore’s consent to the
search of his home to be valid.693 Moore was convicted on four counts of misconduct
involving a controlled substance.694 The court of appeals held that when police obtain a
defendant’s consent after conducting an illegal search or arrest, the consent is presumed
681
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to be tainted, and the burden is on the government to demonstrate a break in the causal
connection between the consent and the prior illegality.695 The court held that the State
failed to meet this burden here and reversed Moore's convictions, holding that consent to
a search based on a prior illegal search is invalid.696
Ward v. State
In Ward v. State,697 the court of appeals held evidence was sufficient to support a
conviction for robbery when a man took merchandise while being observed by a security
officer on camera and later used force during his escape.698 Ward was observed by a
security camera concealing store merchandise.699 He later physically resisted an attempt
by a security officer to detain him.700 Ward was convicted of robbery, theft, and
assault. 701 He appealed, claiming that because the security officer was not physically
present when Ward concealed the merchandise, the property was not in the “immediate
presence and control of another.”702 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction,
holding the property did not need to be in physical contact with the officer, but only be
sufficiently under his control that he could have prevented Ward from taking the property
had he not been subjected to violence or intimidation.703 The court, however, vacated
Ward’s sentence because the trial court judge had improperly relied on the assault, for
which Ward was being separately sentenced, as an aggravating factor.704 The court of
appeals affirmed Ward’s conviction but ordered the superior court to reconsider Ward’s
sentence.705
Grossman v. State
In Grossman v. State,706 the court of appeals upheld a second-degree murder
conviction and the accompanying ninety-nine year jail sentence of a man who was an
accomplice to a murder.707 Grossman was involved in a dispute, which escalated to a
beating and left one man dead.708 A jury convicted Grossman of second-degree murder
and the judge sentenced him to ninety-nine years in jail.709 Grossman appealed, claiming
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that the jury was improperly instructed on the meaning of an “accomplice,” and also that
the sentence was outside the acceptable range of jail time for the crime.710 The court held
that the jury was correctly instructed that an accomplice must have intent to promote or
facilitate the conduct that constitutes the crime.711 The court further held that the ninetynine year sentence was appropriate in light of Grossman’s more than twenty prior
convictions.712 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that both the second-degree
murder conviction and the ninety-nine year jail sentence were proper.713
McDole v. State
In McDole v. State,714 the court of appeals held that a defendant was a second
felony offender for purposes of presumptive sentencing because his series of thefts began
before the statutory ten-year period expired and that it was harmless error not to submit a
question about an aggravating factor to the jury.715 McDole was convicted of thirty-one
counts of unsworn falsification and one count of second-degree theft for unlawfully
claiming employment benefits over a two-year period.716 In sentencing, the superior
court found that McDole was a second felony offender and that an aggravating factor
applied.717 McDole appealed both findings.718 The court of appeals found him to be a
second felony offender because his conduct had amounted to second-degree theft before
the ten-year limit for presumptive sentencing expired.719 The court of appeals also held
that it was harmless error not to submit the question of an aggravating factor to the jury
because no reasonable jury would find in his favor.720 The court of appeals found that
McDole was properly sentenced as a second felony offender with the aggravating factor
and affirmed the decision of the superior court.721
Simon v. State
In Simon v. State,722 the court of appeals held that there was no plain error in the
sentencing of a convicted felon.723 Simon was charged with third-degree sexual assault
and was a third felony offender based on his prior convictions.724 Simon agreed to a plea
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that would result in a sentence of three to five years.725 The superior court sentenced
Simon to five years, and Simon appealed.726 The court of appeals held that because
Simon’s attorney did not object to the sentencing procedure at trial, Simon would have to
show plain error on appeal, which he did not.727 In order for there to be plain error, the
court of appeals held, Simon would have to show that there was no tactical reason for the
failure to raise the objection at trial and that the error was so obvious that it would be
recognized by a competent judge or lawyer.728 The court also found that Simon did not
waive his right to challenge the severity of his sentence by signing the plea agreement.729
However, the court held that five years was appropriate.730 The court of appeals affirmed
the lower court’s ruling, holding that Simon’s five year sentence was not in plain error.731
Snelling v. State
In Snelling v. State,732 the court of appeals held that there was no error in failing
to give a defendant a jury trial.733 Snelling was prosecuted for possession of cocaine.734
He agreed to a plea agreement and admitted to having a prior federal felony conviction
for a bank robbery.735 Because of his prior felony conviction, the superior court applied
two aggravating factors to increase Snelling’s term of imprisonment.736 Snelling
appealed the increased term, claiming that he was entitled to a jury trial with respect to
the aggravating factors.737 The court of appealed affirmed the increased term because
robbery was a more serious class felony than possession of cocaine without intent to
distribute and the superior court properly applied this factor.738
Moore v. State
In Moore v. State,739 the court of appeals held that a defendant needed more than
just general dissatisfaction to remove his court appointed attorney and that the
defendant’s first-degree and second-degree sexual assault sentencing should have been
merged.740 Moore was convicted of attempted first-degree sexual assault, attempted
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second-degree sexual assault, and first-degree burglary.741 On the first day of trial,
Moore tried to have his attorney removed from the case because of general dissatisfaction
with him, but the trial court denied this request.742 Moore appealed his conviction,
claiming the trial court erred in denying his request to replace his attorney and that his
first-degree and second-degree attempted sexual assault sentencing should have been
merged.743 The court of appeals held that the right to counsel did not include the right to
reject an appointed counsel without showing cause. 744 To determine such a showing, the
trial judge was required to inquire into the nature of the dispute.745 Because the trial
judge did inquire into the nature of the dispute and found insufficient reason for
substitution of counsel, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not err in its
decision.746 Finally, the court of appeals held that the sentencing of the first-degree and
second-degree attempted sexual assault charges should be merged because the two
statutes protected fundamentally the same societal interest and there was no significant or
substantial difference in Moore’s intent or conduct in the two crimes.747
Allen v. State
In Allen v. State,748 the court of appeals held that a man convicted of driving with
a suspended license was entitled to a jury instruction on necessity.749 Allen’s mother had
been driving the car, and Allen took over when she began to feel ill and started
weaving.750 At trial, Allen claimed the defense of necessity, alleging that he drove to get
to a nearby payphone to call for medical help for his mother.751 The trial judge
concluded, as a matter of law, that Allen had an adequate and reasonably available
alternative of walking to a closer payphone and thus denied the jury instruction on
necessity and precluded evidence on it.752 The court of appeals held that the adequacy of
a reasonable alternative is only a question of law if the defendant knew or had reason to
know of the alternative.753 Because Allen presented evidence to show that he believed
his mother was in need of speedy medical attention and that he did not know there was a
closer phone, the jury could properly have found in favor of Allen.754 The appellate court
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reversed and granted a new trial, holding Allen was entitled to a jury instruction on
necessity.755
Anderson v. State
In Anderson v. State,756 the court of appeals held a defendant’s identification
made during a show-up was allowable because it was necessary,757 his throwing a gun
out of a window during a chase was not tampering with evidence,758 and his sentence was
improper because it relied on an aggravating factor based on conduct for which he was
being separately sentenced.759 While being chased by police shortly after he committed a
crime, Anderson threw his gun out the window.760 He was caught and identified by the
victim during a show-up, where he was the only suspect shown to the victim.761 The
court first upheld the use of the show-up, stating that since the show-up was necessary
under the circumstances, the court did not need to further assess the reliability of the
witness.762 Second, the court held that although tossing evidence in some cases could
constitute evidence tampering, doing so here would frustrate legislative intent.763 Finally,
the court held Anderson’s sentence was improper because his sentence was partly based
on conduct for which he had been separately sentenced.764 The court of appeals reversed
his conviction for evidence tampering and remanded for sentencing for his other
crimes.765
State v. Thomas
In State v. Thomas,766 the court of appeals held that a probation condition is
proper when reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the offender.767 Thomas was
indicted on the basis of evidence found during a drug search that was a condition of his
parole.768 A superior court suppressed the evidence on the theory that the drug-search
probation condition was invalid because it was not directly related to the prior
conviction.769 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the condition was valid
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because Thomas’s record showed a history of drug problems.770 The court of appeals
held that a probation condition need not be directly related to the elements of the crime
committed as long as it is reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the offender.771
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VII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Ninth Circuit
Galvan v. Department of Corrections
In Galvan v. Department of Corrections,772 the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant
who had not raised a federal constitutional claim in the state supreme court had not
exhausted state remedies.773 Galvan pled guilty to second degree murder, but then sought
post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.774 After
lower courts denied her federal and state claims,775 Galvan petitioned the supreme court
for review of her state claims only.776 After the supreme court denied her petition, she
filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus.777 The district court dismissed her
petition because she had not exhausted her state and federal claims in the state supreme
court.778 Galvan appealed.779 The Ninth Circuit held that regardless of whether she
addressed the federal issues before the court of appeals, Galvan would have had to bring
them before the state supreme court in order to fully exhaust the available state
remedies.780 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, dismissing Galvan’s
habeas petition because she yet to exhaust all available state remedies.781
Alaska Court of Appeals
Paige v. State
In Paige v. State,782 the court of appeals held that a convicted criminal’s multiple
sentences must be concurrent when the sentencing judge did not specify whether the
defendant’s sentences would be concurrent or consecutive.783 Paige was convicted of
multiple crimes arising out of two different incidents.784 At Paige’s sentencing, the
presiding judge did not specify whether the sentences would be concurrent or consecutive
but stated later, in a written opinion, that the sentences would be served consecutively.785
The court of appeals held that a judge’s oral sentencing remarks control over a later,
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conflicting written judgment.786 Restricting its holding to sentences imposed under the
former sentencing statute,787 the court of appeals reversed the imposition of consecutive
sentences,788 holding that because the judge’s remarks did not clearly show an intent to
impose consecutive sentences, the sentences should be imposed concurrently.789
Yang v. State
In Yang v. State,790 the court of appeals held that it was reasonable to infer that a
non-native English speaker understood his legal obligation to submit to a breath test
when he refused such a test, and that evidence of the driver’s prior submission to a breath
test was properly admitted.791 Yang, who claimed a poor command of English,792 refused
to submit to a breath alcohol test after being warned that if he refused he would be
charged with a crime.793 He was subsequently convicted of refusing to submit to the
breath test.794 The court held that evidence of Yang’s prior submission to a breath test
was properly admitted, because one could reasonably infer from this that he was familiar
with the test and understood what the officer was asking him to do.795 The court further
held that giving or understanding specific warnings about the repercussions of refusing a
breath test were not separate elements of the crime of breath test refusal.796 Rather, the
State had to prove Yang understood, or reasonably should have understood, the purpose
of the breath test and his legal obligation to take the test.797 The court held the evidence
was sufficient to support the inference that Yang understood both the purpose of the test
and the legal obligation to take it,798 and accordingly affirmed his conviction.799
Soundara v. State
In Soundara v. State,800 the court of appeals held that (1) a presumptive term for
mitigated kidnapping was valid, (2) a defendant’s convictions for assault merged, as the
jury did not determine the number of underlying acts, and (3) the court should have
determined whether a juror knowingly withheld relevant information and should have
786

Id.
Id.
788
Id. at 1248–49.
789
Id. at 1246–48.
790
107 P.3d 302 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
791
Id. at 313.
792
Id. at 304–05.
793
Id.
794
Id. at 305.
795
Id. at 306.
796
Id. at 312.
797
Id.
798
Id. at 313.
799
Id. at 314.
800
107 P.3d 290 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
787

58

been dismissed for cause.801 Soundara was convicted of mitigated kidnapping and assault
of his wife.802 During voir dire, juror Stahn did not respond when was asked whether
there was any reason he could not serve fairly as a juror.803 After the trial began, Stahn
revealed that his mother had been a victim of domestic violence, but he remained on the
jury.804 On appeal, Soundara argued that the seven-year term was unfair for mitigated
kidnapping because normal kidnapping carries a five-year mandatory sentence.805 The
court rejected this argument, distinguishing mandatory sentences from presumptive
sentencing.806 The court also found that the two assault convictions must merge because
the jury was not asked whether two separate acts were committed.807 Finally, the court
held that the district court erred by not determining whether Stahn had consciously
withheld that his mother had been a victim of domestic violence during voir dire.808 The
court of appeals remanded for such a determination and further instructed that if
Soundara (1) would have challenged Stahn based on this information, (2) the information
was directly relevant to the case and (3) there was a reasonable possibility that Stahn’s
knowledge affected Stahn's vote, Soundara would be entitled to a new trial.809
McBath v. State
In McBath v. State,810 the court of appeals held that drugs found on an individual
during an arguably illegal investigative stop were obtained lawfully because there were
pre-existing warrants for the individual’s arrest.811 During the course of an arguably
illegal investigative traffic stop, the police learned of two unserved warrants for
McBath’s arrest.812 The discovery of methamphetamines during a search ultimately led
to McBath’s conviction for possession of controlled substances. 813 McBath appealed on
the grounds that any evidence obtained as a result of the illegal stop must be
suppressed.814 The court of appeals held that a pre-existing arrest warrant can attenuate
the taint of a prior illegal stop when evidence was discovered during the execution of that
warrant.815 The court further found that the initial illegal stop was not a manifestation of
flagrant police misconduct.816 Because the police found methamphetamines only after
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learning of McBath’s outstanding warrants, and because they had a valid reason for
initially detaining McBath to ascertain his identity, the court held that any taint was too
attenuated to affect the admissibility of the contraband.817 Thus, the judgment of the
superior court was affirmed.818
State v. Savo
In State v. Savo,819 the court of appeals held that a defendant did not receive
ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial.820 Following his conviction for sexual
assault, Savo petitioned for post-conviction relief on the grounds that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.821 The superior court granted Savo’s petition for a new
trial, based primarily on his attorney’s cross examination of the victim, and the state
appealed.822 The court of appeals first determined that the state was not procedurally
barred from appealing the superior court’s ruling by failing to submit a supplemental
memorandum to the superior court in support of its argument.823 The court of appeals
found each of Savo’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel to be unfounded and
therefore he did not suffer ineffective assistance of counsel and was not prejudiced.824
The court of appeals reversed the ruling of the superior court and reinstated Savo’s
conviction.825
Baker v. State
In Baker v. State,826 the court of appeals upheld the denial of a defendant's motion
to dismiss based on his right to a speedy trial, holding that the trial court erred in
imposing a consecutive and excessive sentence.827 Baker appealed his convictions for
felony driving while intoxicated, felony refusal to take a breath test, driving with a
revoked license, and third degree criminal mischief.828 The court of appeals held that the
trial court did not err in denying Baker’s motion to dismiss based on his right to a speedy
trial.829 The court of appeals also held that Baker’s sentence was improper and excessive
because the trial court judge orally indicated during sentencing that the sentence should
have been concurrent with rather than consecutive to his previous sentence.830 Moreover,
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because the trial court improperly found that Baker was previously convicted of a more
serious felony it wrongly imposed consecutive minimum sentences.831 Therefore, the
court of appeals affirmed Baker’s conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded for
re-sentencing.832
Ratliff v. State
In Ratliff v. State,833 the court of appeals held that a formal test for evaluating the
validity of scientific evidence was not required for shoeprint analysis and that a
criminologist's shoeprint analysis was based on valid principles and methodology.834
Ratliff was convicted of burglary, theft, and criminal mischief where his shoeprint
matched that of a shoeprint found at the scene of the crime.835 At trial, Ratliff challenged
the validity of the shoeprint analysis, and the trial court judge concluded that formal
analysis of the expert testimony was not necessary or, in the alternative, that it would
meet the requirements of formal analysis.836 Ratliff only appealed the conclusion that
formal analysis was not required.837 The court of appeals held that the trial judge fulfilled
his duty with respect to expert testimony by evaluating the evidence and determining that
a formal analysis of the methodology was not required.838 The court of appeals found
that no error was committed in allowing the shoeprint evidence and affirmed the superior
court's decision.839
Gladden v. State
In Gladden v. State,840 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s right to counsel
was violated because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive it.841 Gladden, who
was accused of driving with a suspended license, informed the trial judge that he did not
want court-appointed counsel.842 He pursued private counsel by means the superior court
deemed unlikely to be successful, and the court allowed the case to go to trial despite
Gladden’s lack of representation.843 After trial, Gladden was convicted.844 The court of
appeals held that, although Gladden’s actions did imply pro se representation, the record
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did not show that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.845 The
record was deficient in this regard because there was no evidence that the judge explained
what an attorney could offer, outlined the risks of pro se representation, asked Gladden if
he understood these risks, or inquired into Gladden’s educational background and
experience with the criminal justice system.846 The court of appeals reversed the
conviction, holding that the record did not reflect a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
right to counsel.847
State v. Cameron
In State v. Cameron,848 the court of appeals held that a prosecutor was not
required to notify the grand jury of the defendant’s desire to testify.849 After being
arrested for assault, Cameron requested to testify before the grand jury, but the prosecutor
did not respond or notify the grand jury of the request.850 The superior court granted
Cameron’s request to dismiss his subsequent indictment, and the State appealed.851
Cameron argued on appeal that (1) his proposed testimony was exculpatory evidence and
therefore must be presented to the grand jury, and (2) the prosecutor had a duty to notify
the grand jury of his desire to testify.852 The court of appeals rejected both arguments,
holding that Cameron’s testimony was not exculpatory evidence because it did not tend
to negate his guilt in and of itself, and that requiring the prosecutor to notify the grand
jury of his request would modify pre-existing common law.853 Therefore, the court of
appeals reversed, holding that the prosecutor did not have a duty to grant Cameron’s
request or notify the grand jury.854
Kelly v. State
In Kelly v. State,855 the court of appeals held that testimony supporting an
affirmative defense should have been admitted under a hearsay exception.856 Kelly was
charged with sexual abuse of a minor for having contact and attempting to engage in
sexual intercourse with K.P., who was under 16 years of age.857 On the evening of the
incident, Kelly told a friend, Andrews, that he believed K.P. to be 16 years old.858 But
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the trial court determined Andrews’ statements were inadmissible hearsay and that Kelly
failed to present sufficient evidence supporting an affirmative defense.859 The court of
appeals held that a defendant’s out of court assertion of innocence may be introduced as
an exception to the hearsay rule if the statement (1) relates to the declarant’s then existing
state of mind, (2) is not offered to prove the fact believed, and (3) relates to a relevant
purpose and is offered only for that purpose.860 Because the statement pertained to
Kelly’s state of mind at the time of the crime, was not offered to prove that K.P. was in
fact 16 years old, and was relevant to prove a reasonable mistake of fact, the court of
appeals determined that Andrews’ testimony was admissible under a hearsay
exception.861 Because exclusion of the testimony undermined Kelly’s defense, the court
reversed Kelly’s convictions.862
State v. Anderson
In State v. Anderson,863 the court of appeals held that sending in a “false friend” to
get a jailed suspect to make incriminating statements does not violate Miranda.864 After
arresting Anderson for a robbery, police enlisted a friend of Anderson’s to elicit
statements from him about another robbery he may have committed.865 The superior
court suppressed Anderson’s statements, ruling that it was unfair to allow the police to
circumvent Anderson’s right to counsel by enlisting a “false friend.”866 However, the
court of appeals ruled that Anderson could have chosen to not speak with the “false
friend” and was not subjected to a coercive atmosphere.867 Therefore, the court of
appeals reversed the superior court, holding that police do not violate Miranda when they
enlist a “false friend” to obtain incriminating statements from a suspect.868
Swarner v. Alaska
In Swarner v. Alaska,869 the court of appeals held that an extradition request in the
form of an information sworn before a notary was legal under Alaska’s extradition
laws.870 Montana’s governor requested that Alaska’s governor arrest Swarner via an
information sworn before a notary.871 Swarner was arrested in Alaska and petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus to contest his extradition by claiming that federal extradition law
859
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required an extradition document to be made before a magistrate and not a notary.872 The
superior court denied Swarner’s petition for the writ, and he appealed.873 The court of
appeals held that federal extradition law set circumstances under which a state must
extradite but also allowed states to authorize additional methods of extradition.874
Because an information sworn in front of a notary is a valid form of extradition under
Alaska law, the court of appeals held that the extradition request was proper and affirmed
the superior court’s denial of Swarner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.875
Greist v. State
In Greist v. State,876 the court of appeals held that a judge may use a defendant’s
prior convictions as an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes without holding a jury
trial on that factor.877 Greist was sentenced to three years in prison for third-degree
assault. 878 Greist appealed the sentence, arguing that it violated the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington879 because he did not receive a jury
trial on any aggravating factors.880 The court of appeals held that Blakely expressly
allowed the use of prior convictions as a sentencing factor without the need for a jury trial
or proof beyond a reasonable doubt.881 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the sentence,
holding that the superior court could consider Greist’s prior convictions as an aggravating
factor without a jury trial.882
State v. Gonzales
In State v. Gonzales,883 the court of appeals held that a ten-year delay between an
investigation and its resulting charges was cause for dismissal of those charges because
the State lacked a valid reason for the delay.884 Also, the State’s loss of certain evidence
prejudiced the defendant.885 In 1992, Gonzales was interviewed as the suspect in an
investigation of sexual abuse of a minor.886 Gonzales then left Alaska and the State
searched for his whereabouts with no success.887 In 2002, Gonzales was found and
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charged with sexual abuse pursuant to the 1992 investigation and also new crimes
committed in 2002.888 Gonzales moved to dismiss the charges from the 1992
investigation, and the superior court granted his motion.889 The State appealed.890 The
court of appeals held that the ten-year gap violated the defendant’s due process rights
because the State lacked a valid reason for the delay, and the delay prejudiced the
defendant in that significant evidence relating to the investigation was lost, adversely
affecting his ability to present a defense.891 The court of appeals affirmed the superior
court’s dismissal of the State’s claims.892
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VIII. ELECTION LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage
In DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage,893 the supreme court held that random
selection of a fixed order of candidates’ names on an election ballot was constitutional
and that there was no significant deviation from the law to affect the election outcome by
which to invalidate a voter approved amendment.894 DeNardo sued the Municipality of
Anchorage alleging that the fixed order of the candidates’ names on the 2003 Anchorage
mayoral election ballot created a positional bias that impermissibly burdened the right to
vote.895 De Nardo argued that procedural defects in the election should invalidate the
passage of Proposition 2, which removed run-off elections, except for mayoral races,
when no candidates receive more than 45% of the vote.896 The superior court dismissed
the case on summary judgment and DeNardo appealed.897 The supreme court found that
Sonneman v. State,898 which held that positional bias does not impermissibly burden the
right to vote, controlled here; even though the positional bias may have affected the
election results.899 Furthermore, the supreme court found that challengers to postelection contests have the burden of showing that there was a significant deviation from
the law that affected the result of the election.900 DeNardo failed to meet this burden and
hence, the supreme court affirmed the summary judgment.901
Martinez v. Cape Fox Corp.
In Martinez v. Cape Fox Corp.,902 the supreme court held 1) that the superior
court had the authority to bar from reelection a board member who engaged in
misconduct even though he was not a director at the time of the judgment;903 2) that the
evidence supported a fifteen-year ban from board service, but not a lifetime ban;904 3)
that the superior court was not required to make a specific finding on the board member’s
“unclean hands” defense;905 and 4) that the board member was not entitled to partial
893

105 P.3d 136 (Alaska 2005).
Id. at 145.
895
Id. at 138.
896
Id.
897
Id. at 139.
898
969 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1998).
899
DeNardo, 105 P.3d at 139–40.
900
Id. at 141.
901
Id. at 138.
902
113 P.3d 1226 (Alaska 2005).
903
Id. at 1231.
904
Id. at 1233–34.
905
Id. at 1234.
894

66

indemnification.906 Martinez was a director of Cape Fox who was found to have
committed fraud and abused his authority as director.907 The superior court entered an
order barring Martinez for life from service as director for Cape Fox and entered a
monetary judgment against him.908 Martinez appealed.909 The court held that a director
may be barred from future service regardless of whether that director was serving on the
board at the time the complaint was filed.910 Also, the court articulated a seven-factor
test for determining whether a ban is proper: 1) the egregiousness of the underlying
violation, 2) the defendant’s past record of misconduct, 3) the defendant’s position or role
at the time of the violation, 4) the defendant’s degree of scienter, 5) the defendant’s
economic stake in the violation, 6) the likelihood that the misconduct would recur, and 7)
whether there is reason to suspect that the shareholder democracy will not be sufficient to
prevent reelection of an unfit director.911 Here, the court found five of the seven factors
to be present: 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6.912 However, the court found these findings to be sufficient
to impose a fifteen-year ban, but not a lifetime ban.913 Furthermore, the court found that
the superior court did not err in refusing to make a specific finding on Martinez’s claim
of “clean hands” because he presented no evidence with regard to this defense.914
Finally, the court held that Martinez was not entitled to partial indemnification because
the jury found against him on all issues.915 The court affirmed the judgment against
Martinez, vacated the lifetime bar from board service, and remanded with instruction to
enter a new order barring Martinez from board service for fifteen years.916
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IX. EMPLOYMENT LAW
Ninth Circuit
Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.
In Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,917 the Ninth Circuit held that an employee has a
legitimate claim under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) only if he actually
participated in the care of a family member.918 Tellis, an employee of Alaska Airlines,
was terminated because of unexcused absences.919 Tellis and his union filed a grievance
in response, and Alaska Airlines offered to reinstate him if he would allow a disciplinary
letter to be placed in his file.920 Tellis did not agree and subsequently sued.921 The
district court granted Alaska Airlines’ motion for summary judgment finding that Tellis
did not present a valid claim under the FMLA because he did not leave his job to care for
his pregnant wife as he had claimed.922 Tellis appealed.923 The Ninth Circuit held that
family care under the FMLA required actual care for a family member and that Tellis’
absences were not a result of care for his pregnant wife.924 As a result, his absence from
work was not protected under the FMLA.925 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Alaska Airlines.926
EEOC v. National Education Ass'n, Alaska
In EEOC v. National Education Ass’n, Alaska,927 the Ninth Circuit held that
offensive conduct that is not facially sex-specific may violate Title VII if there is
sufficient circumstantial evidence of differences in harassment suffered by female and
male employees.928 Three female employees of the National Education Association
("NEA") filed Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charges against
the NEA because of harassment by their employer in the form of hostile shouting and
physical conduct.929 The district court granted the NEA's motion for summary judgment,
stating that there was no evidence of sex-specific harassment, and the EEOC appealed.930
The Ninth Circuit held that the difference in subjective effects as well as objective
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aspects of the alleged discrimination is relevant to whether women were treated
differently than men, even if the conduct was not facially sex-specific or genderspecific.931 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's granting of summary
judgment and remanded the case, holding that there was sufficient evidence for a
reasonable person to conclude that the harassment was because of sex and was
sufficiently severe to support a Title VII claim.932

Alaska Supreme Court
Hammond v. State, Department of Transportation & Public Facilities
In Hammond v. State, Department of Transportation & Public Facilities,933 the
supreme court held that an employee’s decision to arbitrate under a collective bargaining
agreement did not preclude the litigation of a related statutory claim.934 After being
terminated, Hammond filed a grievance under his union’s collective bargaining
agreement.935 The arbitrator ruled against Hammond.936 Hammond subsequently
brought a statutory claim in superior court.937 The court granted summary judgment
against Hammond, holding that the decision of the arbitrator precluded him from
litigating his statutory claim.938 The supreme court held that an employee’s statutory
claim could be precluded only if that employee clearly and unmistakably submitted the
claim to arbitration.939 Since Hammond had not clearly and unmistakably submitted it to
arbitration, his statutory claim was not precluded and the court reversed and remanded for
litigation as to the statutory claim.940
Bartley v. State, Department of Administration
In Bartley v. State, Department of Administration,941 the supreme court held that:
1) two teachers who retired under the Teachers’ Retirement System (“TRS”) were only
eligible for early retirement under the Teachers’ Defined Retirement Plan, and 2) the TRS
board improperly used two different rates to calculate their arrearage indebtedness.942
The Bartleys taught for the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) in Alaska and out of state ,
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became TRS members, and retired.943 The TRS board found the Bartleys were only
eligible for early retirement and used two separate rates to determine the Bartleys’
arrearage indebtedness: one for teaching for the BIA and the other for teaching outside of
Alaska.944 The superior court upheld the board’s findings.945 The supreme court upheld
the finding that the Bartleys were only eligible for early retirement.946 In doing so, the
court held that to qualify for normal retirement under Alaska Statutes section
14.25.110(a)(1), teachers must have been first hired into a TRS position July 1, 1975.947
The “first hired” language refers only to when a teacher is hired into a TRS position and
does not encompass any creditable non-TRS service.948 The Bartleys were merely hired
into BIA service, not a TRS position, before July 1, 1975.949 Further, the supreme court
held that the board improperly used two rates when calculating the Bartleys’ arrearage
indebtedness.950 The court held that a claimant’s entire arrearage indebtedness should be
calculated at a single rate.951 Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the finding that the
Bartleys were eligible only for early retirement but remanded the case for recalculation of
the arrearage indebtedness.952
Bailey v. Texas Instruments
In Bailey v. Texas Instruments,953 the supreme court held that a statute of
limitations was constitutionally valid, that the statute applied to medical claims954 and
that it barred a claimant from suing an employer regarding payment of some, but not all,
of his workers compensation claims.955 Bailey was an injured worker who had been
receiving workers compensation payments from his employer.956 Bailey’s employer
disputed his claims for medical benefits in 1997, 1999 and 2001.957 Workers’
compensation claimants have two years to request a hearing after an employee disputes a
claim.958 Bailey had knowledge of the statute of limitations, yet he neglected to request a
hearing until July 2002.959 The superior court determined that the 1999 and 2001 claims
could not restart the statute of limitations because they were merely restatements of the
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1997 claim, and denied hearing all three claims.960 Bailey appealed on the grounds that
the statute did not govern medical claims and was a constitutional violation of procedural
due process, substantive due process and equal protection.961 Rejecting these arguments
as without merit, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s determination that
Bailey’s 1997 and 1999 claims should be dismissed as untimely.962 The supreme court
reversed as to the 2001 claim, however, finding it was substantively distinct from the
earlier claims and therefore within the statute of limitations.963 The case was remanded
for further proceedings on the 2001 claim.964
Rockney v. Boslough Construction Co.
In Rockney v. Boslough Construction Co.,965 the supreme court held that
substantial evidence failed to support findings that a workers’ compensation plan would
meet a claimant’s remunerative wage and that the plan could be completed within the
statutory time frame.966 The court further held that the statutory presumption of
compensability did not apply.967 Rockney’s workers’ compensation reemployment plan
provided that he be trained as an architectural drafter after he injured his back and could
no longer work in construction.968 The supreme court held that reemployment plans must
provide for remunerative employability969 and must be completed within two years of
commencement.970 Here, the court found that there was no substantial evidence
indicating that Rockney would be reemployed at his remunerative hourly wage or that he
would be able to complete the plan within the statutory time limit.971 The supreme court
held that the workers’ compensation board abused its discretion in approving Rockney’s
reemployment plan.972 The court further rejected Rockney’s argument that a presumption
of compensability should have been applied by the workers’ compensation board because
no party disputed Rockney’s entitlement to benefits or his employer’s liability for those
benefits.973
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Ellison v. Local 375
In Ellison v. Local 375,974 the supreme court held that a union is not liable for
failing to respond to a sexually discriminatory environment unless it is asked to do so and
declines for discriminatory reasons.975 Ellison reported several incidents of alleged
sexual harassment and discrimination to union representatives976 but did not request that
they file a grievance or take any other remedial action.977 Adopting the reasoning that
unions have no duty to remedy racial or sexual harassment because they typically do not
control the workplace, the supreme court held that mere passivity cannot create liability
for a union978 and that union liability for non-action in response to discrimination requires
both a request to take action and a refusal to do so for discriminatory reasons.979
Ranney v. Whitewater Engineering
In Ranney v. Whitewater Engineering,980 the supreme court held that the
limitation of spousal death benefits to married couples does not violate rights to privacy
and equal protection under the Alaska Constitution.981 Sharon Ranney was denied
spousal death benefits after her long term partner died because they were unmarried.982
The superior court upheld the compensation board’s conclusion that marriage is required
in order to receive death benefits, and Ranney appealed.983 The supreme court held that
the language of the spousal benefits statute did not apply to unmarried partners such as
Ranney.984 The supreme court held that granting death benefits to married couples did
not impose a significant burden on those who choose not to marry and therefore did not
infringe Ranney’s right to have an unmarried relationship as guaranteed by Alaska’s right
to privacy.985 Applying the state’s three-step sliding scale equal protection test –
weighing the importance of the individual right, the importance of the government
purpose, and the means employed to further that purpose986 – the supreme court held that
an economic interest in death benefits is entitled only to minimum protection and is
outweighed by the state’s interest in providing a quick, efficient, fair, and predictable
system of compensation.987 The supreme court upheld the denial of death benefits and
affirmed the decisions of the compensation board and the superior court.988
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Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc.
In Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc.,989 the supreme court held that an
employee was wrongfully terminated for testifying in previous litigation involving his
employer.990 Reust sued Alaska Petroleum Contractors (“APC”) for wrongful
termination when he was fired for having participated in previous litigation involving
APC.991 A jury found for Reust, awarding compensatory damages, including lost wages,
and punitive damages.992 Both parties appealed.993 The supreme court held that the
superior court’s jury instructions, which failed to list consideration as an element of
contract formation, did not affect the jury’s finding that APC had hired Reust.994 The
court also found that discharging Reust was contrary to public policy.995 However, the
court elaborated that the lost wages award was for too long of a period.996 The court also
rejected Reust’s claims that the punitive damages cap was unconstitutional,997 but found
that the lower court applied the wrong cap.998 Finally, the court found that the State was
allowed to intervene and thereby receive half of the punitive damage award.999 The
supreme court remanded the case for reduction of the award of lost wages, application of
a new punitive damages cap, and review of the recalculated punitive damages award for
excessiveness, but affirmed the remainder of the superior court’s decision.1000
State, Public Employees’ Retirement Board v. Morton
In State, Public Employees’ Retirement Board v. Morton,1001 the supreme court
held that an employee was entitled to receive benefits for an occupational disability when
he could not return to public employment, even though he obtained a new job that paid
more than his old salary.1002 Morton received occupational disability benefits when he
was injured in the course of his employment with the Public Employees’ Retirement
System (“PERS”).1003 When Morton found a new job outside of PERS, the Retirement
Board cancelled his benefits pursuant to the “75% rule.”1004 This was an unwritten policy
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that stated that an employee was not eligible for benefits if he earned outside income of
more than 75% of his previous salary.1005 The superior court reversed the Board’s
termination of Morton’s benefits, and the Board appealed.1006 The supreme court held
that the 75% rule was contrary to relevant Alaska statutes and that a person who was
unable to perform a PERS job, yet willing to perform another job, was still within the
definition of occupational disability.1007 The supreme court therefore affirmed the
superior court’s holding.1008
Municipality of Anchorage v. Devon
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Devon,1009 the supreme court held that the Alaska
Workers’ Compensation Board (“AWCB”) properly denied an employer’s petition for
reimbursement of benefits when a physician’s testimony provided substantial evidence
that a worker did not misrepresent his condition.1010 Devon suffered injuries in the
course of his employment with the Municipality of Anchorage and was awarded workers’
compensation benefits.1011 The Municipality sought reimbursement for benefits paid to
Devon based on video surveillance of Devon engaging in activities inconsistent with his
injury claims.1012 The AWCB found in favor of Devon, relying on a physician’s
testimony that the videotaped activities were not inconsistent with Devon’s claims.1013
The municipality appealed, and the superior court affirmed.1014 On appeal, the supreme
court deferred to the AWCB’s determination of witness credibility with respect to the
physician’s testimony.1015 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s holding
that there was substantial evidence that Devon did not file his claims fraudulently.1016
Scammon Bay Ass’n v. Ulak
In Scammon Bay Ass’n v. Ulak,1017 the supreme court held that a motion to
intervene by an employer filed the day before a hearing was timely.1018 Ulak was injured
at work and received workers’ compensation benefits.1019 Normally an employer may
place a lien on any money the employee receives from third-party tortfeasors to recover
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those benefits.1020 Ulak reached an agreement with the third-party tortfeasors that
assigned some fault to his employer, which could have affected the employer’s ability to
recover.1021 In finding the motion timely, the court noted that the employer was notified
of the hearing only twelve days before the hearing to finalize the agreement.1022 Further,
the prejudice to the other parties was small,1023 and if the motion had been denied the
employer could have lost its lien.1024 The court held that the motion was timely and
remanded the matter to the superior court.1025

1020

ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.015(g) (2004).
Scammon Bay, 126 P.3d at 141–42.
1022
Id. at 145.
1023
Id. at 145–46.
1024
Id. at 146.
1025
Id. at 147.
1021

75

X. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Ninth Circuit
Alaska Trojan Partnership v. Gutierrez
In Alaska Trojan Partnership v. Gutierrez,1026 the Ninth Circuit held that the
owner of a crabbing vessel was improperly denied a brown king crab endorsement.1027
The National Marine Fisheries Service denied an endorsement because it was determined
that Alaska Trojan made only two “documented harvests” during the endorsement
qualification period.1028 Alaska Trojan filed suit claiming it made three “documented
harvests” and was entitled to the endorsement.1029 The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and Alaska Trojan appealed.1030 The Ninth Circuit held that
the agency’s interpretation of “documented harvest” was inconsistent with both the plain
meaning of the statute and the intent of the license limitation program that authorized the
endorsements.1031 The court went on to say that “there is no reasonable interpretation [of
the statute] that would deny Alaska Trojan” an endorsement.1032 The case was remanded
with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Alaska Trojan.1033
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XI. ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Alaska Supreme Court
In re Hanlon
In In re Hanlon,1034 the supreme court held that an attorney’s cooperation with the
disciplinary committee and the negative effects of suspension on the attorney’s practice
and family do not mitigate misconduct.1035 One of Hanlon’s clients filed a grievance that
he neglected her claim.1036 To avoid a malpractice claim, Hanlon fabricated a settlement
agreement and paid the client out of his own funds.1037 In response to a subsequent
inquiry from the Alaska Bar Association, Hanlon falsely indicated that the client’s case
had reached a settlement.1038 The Board of Governors recommended that Hanlon be
suspended for three years, and Hanlon appealed the recommendation.1039 The supreme
court found that Hanlon only cooperated with the disciplinary proceedings after his
deceitful actions were caught by the bar; therefore, it was not considered a mitigating
factor.1040 Also, the supreme court held that the effects of a penalty on an attorney’s
practice or family life are not mitigating factors because giving too much weight to these
considerations would not serve the overall purpose of disciplining attorneys, which is to
protect the public.1041 Hence, the supreme court suspended Hanlon for three years.1042
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XII. FAMILY LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Silvan v. Alcina
In Silvan v. Alcina,1043 the supreme court held in a divorce proceeding that if the
mother moved outside of Alaska, the best interests of the children would require that the
father gain primary custody.1044 Silvan, the mother, wanted to divorce Alcina, the father,
and move to Arizona.1045 The superior court granted Silvan shared custody of the
children with Alcina but stipulated that if Silvan moved to Arizona, it would be in the
best interest of the children for them to stay with Alcina in Alaska.1046 The supreme
court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that Alcina was more willing to
promote an open custodial relationship with the other parent and it was appropriate for
the superior court to weigh this fact in its decision.1047 Thus, while Silvan would have
shared custody if she stayed in Alaska, a move outside of the state would give Alcina
primary custody based on the bests interests of the children.1048
Caldwell v. State, Department of Revenue
In Caldwell v. State, Department of Revenue,1049 the supreme court held that
proceeds from a husband’s sale of stock could not be treated as multi-year income for the
determination of child support.1050 Caldwell sold his stock in a company and signed a
five-year non-compete agreement.1051 The superior court accepted the Child Support
Enforcement Division’s claim that proceeds from the sale of stock were compensation for
the non-compete agreement and therefore qualified as income for child support
purposes.1052 Caldwell appealed, claiming the proceeds were not compensation for the
non-compete agreement, but rather payments for the sale of an asset.1053 The supreme
court held that, because Caldwell was a minority shareholder who could not halt the sale
nor refuse to sign the non-compete agreement, it was improper to view the proceeds as
payment for the agreement.1054 The supreme court thus reversed the child support order
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and remanded for further findings, holding that the proceeds from sale of stock could not
be considered income for child support purposes.1055
McComas v. Kirn
In McComas v. Kirn,1056 the supreme held a domestic violence protective order
was proper where an ex-husband had committed a crime involving domestic violence
against his ex-wife, the actions supporting his ex-wife’s petition for a long-term
protective order were not too remote in time, and the order was not barred by denial of an
earlier request for a protective order.1057 Kirn obtained a protective order against her
husband, McComas, who was incarcerated, but the order was rescinded by the divorce
settlement with the condition that McComas refrain from contacting Kirn directly.1058
One week before McComas was to be released from custody, the superior court heard
and granted Kirn’s petition for a long-term protective order from which McComas
appealed.1059 The supreme court held that the superior court did not clearly err in finding
that McComas committed multiple acts of domestic violence through vandalizing his
former mother-in-law’s car, sending threatening letters to Kirn while incarcerated, and
expressing a desire that she would suffer harm.1060 The supreme court held that because
the last of the threats occurred only a few months prior to Kirn’s petition, the threats were
not too remote in time.1061 Finally the court held that the long-term protective order was
not barred by the divorce because it served as an additional safeguard for Kirn.1062 The
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision to issue a long-term protective
order, holding that the ex-husband had committed a crime involving domestic violence,
the actions were not too remote in time, and the order was not barred by the prior divorce
settlement.1063
Miller v. Miller
In Miller v. Miller,1064 the supreme court held that a marital home and a cash gift
given to a husband by his mother were marital property and that the husband was
responsible for a portion of the wife's attorneys’ fees during divorce proceedings.1065 The
disputed marital property included a house in which the couple lived until they separated
and a cash gift initially invested in a personal account, but subsequently transferred to a
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joint checking account, both of which were given to Chad by his mother.1066 Chad
appealed the superior court’s holding that these items were marital property and its award
of attorneys’ fees.1067 The supreme court found that because both parties shared the
house and both contributed to its maintenance, the superior court’s determination that the
house was marital property was not clearly erroneous.1068 Similarly, the court found that
the superior court's finding that the money became marital property when Chad
transferred it from a personal account to a joint account was not clearly erroneous.1069
Moreover, the superior court correctly valued the estate.1070 Finally, the superior court
had broad discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees based on the relative economic situations
of the parties in divorce proceedings.1071 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior
courts’ findings that the marital home and cash gift were marital property, its valuation of
the marital estate, and its award of attorneys’ fees.1072
McGrew v. State
In McGrew v. State,1073 the supreme court held that during child-in-need-of-aid
(“CINA”) proceedings, the Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services (“DFYS”)
owed a duty of care only to the child involved in the proceedings and not relatives,
including parents or grandparents.1074 The McGrews were grandparents to Lucy M., who
was orphaned when her parents and sibling were killed; DFYS took custody via CINA
proceedings and ultimately placed her in the custody of a family friend.1075 The
McGrews claimed that DFYS failed to provide the McGrews with information on their
granddaughter’s placement, that DFYS failed to inform the court of their interest in
custody of Lucy, and that DFYS did not tell the court that the family friend with whom
Lucy M. was placed had a criminal history.1076 The McGrews asserted claims against
DFYS of negligence and failure to abide by the Alaska Constitution, various state
provisions, and DFYS internal policies.1077 They also claimed intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”).1078 DFYS moved for dismissal of the entire action, and the
superior court dismissed all three counts.1079 The supreme court affirmed the dismissal of
the negligence claim and the constitutional claim because the state did not owe the
1066

Id.
Id.
1068
Id. at 1141.
1069
Id. at 1142.
1070
Id. at 1144.
1071
Id.
1072
Id. at 1139.
1073
106 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2005).
1074
Id. at 320.
1075
Id. at 320–21
1076
Id. at 321.
1077
Id.
1078
Id.
1079
Id.
1067

80

grandparents an actionable duty and alternative remedies were available.1080 The court
further held that an IIED claim by relatives who were a party to a CINA proceeding was
not precluded by the absence of a duty of care.1081 Thus, the court reversed and
remanded the IIED claim, holding that a duty of care was not an essential element of
IIED.1082
Alden v. Children’s Services
In Alden v. Children’s Services,1083 the supreme court held that it was not plain
error to enforce a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights when there was no abuse of
discretion denying contact with the children,1084 nor in rejecting claims that the
relinquishment was conditional.1085 Alden executed a voluntary relinquishment of his
parental rights that, he argues, was conditional upon the successful placement of his
children with an adoptive parent and allowed him to maintain contact with his
children.1086 The adoption of Alden’s children failed, and the children were placed in
foster care.1087 Alden then asked the superior court to withdraw the relinquishment
because the condition of a successful adoption had not been met.1088 Alden also
requested withdrawal of the relinquishment pursuant to Rita T. v. State1089, which held
that parental rights that have been involuntarily terminated may be reinstated upon a
showing that the parent has overcome the problems that lead to the termination.1090 On
appeal from a denial of his claim, Alden added a claim that the relinquishment itself was
invalid because Alaska law does not provide for conditional or partial voluntary
relinquishment.1091 Because this claim was not raised at trial, the supreme court applied a
plain error standard of review and affirmed the superior court’s determination that the
relinquishment was nevertheless neither partial nor conditional.1092 The supreme court
applied an abuse of discretion standard to find no error in denying Alden contact with his
children.1093 The supreme court declined to determine whether a Rita T. claim is
applicable to a voluntary relinquishment, and instead found that the superior court did not
abuse its discretion in finding Alden failed to show good cause to withdraw the
1080
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relinquishment.1094 The supreme court found no plain error nor abuse of discretion in
Alden’s claims and affirmed the superior court’s disposition of the case.1095
Martin v. Dieringer
In Martin v. Dieringer,1096 the supreme court held that the trial court clearly erred
when it found that a loan to a personal representative from an estate was an arm’s length
transaction causing no harm, that proceeds from a life insurance policy were owned by a
personal representative and not the trustor’s children, and that a personal representative
did not breach his fiduciary duty.1097 James Dieringer was the personal representative of
an estate left in trust by Martin to his children.1098 During that time, Dieringer made a
below-market interest rate loan from the estate to a company in which he was a
partner1099 and threatened to charge estate fees when Martin’s son refused to sell him
estate property at a below-market price.1100 The court held that these self-dealing actions
detrimentally affected the estate value and constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.1101
Furthermore, Dieringer claimed that Martin’s $50,000 life insurance policy had been left
to Dieringer individually rather than as a trustee.1102 Because there was no indication that
the gift was intended for Dieringer personally, it was erroneous for the trial court to find
that Dieringer loaned the estate $50,000 for which he could later claim
reimbursement.1103 Thus, the supreme court vacated the trial court’s findings that
Dieringer caused no harm to the estate, personally owned a life insurance policy intended
for the estate, and did not violate his fiduciary duty.1104 The court remanded for a
reconsideration of attorneys’ fees and fees of the personal representative.1105
Lana C. v. Cameron P.
In Lana C. v. Cameron P.,1106 the supreme court held that a non-disclosure order
prohibiting an individual in a domestic violence proceeding from presenting relevant
evidence is contrary to public policy and void.1107 Lana C. was held in contempt by the
superior court for violating a non-disclosure order that prevented her from discussing
allegations of child abuse committed by her ex-husband, Cameron P., against their
1094
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daughter.1108 The superior court also awarded Cameron costs and attorneys’ fees and
prohibited Lana from making any future accusations against Cameron regarding child
abuse.1109 Lana appealed.1110 The supreme court held that a private agreement that
prevents an individual from presenting relevant evidence in a domestic violence hearing
is unenforceable because public policy mandates that individuals be allowed to provide
evidence relevant to litigation and investigation.1111 The supreme court thus reversed the
superior court’s finding of contempt, vacated the non-disclosure order, and remanded to
afford Lana an opportunity to recoup her costs and attorneys’ fees.1112
Chase v. Chase
In Chase v. Chase,1113 the supreme court held that the trial court acted within its
discretion both in awarding sole custody of a couple’s son to the mother and in finding
certain property to be marital property.1114 Judy and Ernest Chase began living together
in 1986, had three children, and later married.1115 A decree of divorce was issued in
2004, in which the superior court awarded primary custody of their youngest child to
Judy contrary to the recommendations of a state custody investigator’s report.1116 In
addition, the superior court found that certain property, purportedly purchased before the
marriage was marital property.1117 Noting that the superior court is under no obligation
to adopt a custody investigator’s recommendations,1118 the supreme court held that the
superior court adequately weighed statutory factors in determining custody and affirmed
its holding.1119 The supreme court affirmed, holding that property may be considered
marital property if it is acquired during any period of premarital cohabitation eventually
resulting in marriage or if it may be shown that the parties intended to treat the property
as marital through actions such as joint residence, ownership or maintenance.1120 The
court further held that the superior court’s designation of the property as marital was
sufficiently supported by the record.1121
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Rick P. v. State
In Rick P. v. State,1122 the supreme court held that a father’s parental rights over
his two children were properly terminated.1123 Rick had left his son Dylan with multiple
caregivers and committed domestic violence against his girlfriend.1124 The State
subsequently removed Dylan from Rick’s custody.1125 Rick also made few contacts with
his daughter, Diane, both before and after paternity tests confirmed he was her biological
father.1126 The superior court issued separate orders terminating Rick’s rights to both
Dylan and Diane,1127 and Rick appealed.1128 The supreme court upheld the superior
court’s orders terminating Rick’s parental rights, holding that Rick’s domestic violence
and other behaviors caused mental injury to Dylan resulting in Dylan’s aggressive
behaviors and that Rick’s attendance at counseling sessions was insufficient to remedy
the problem.1129 The supreme court also upheld termination of parental rights over
Diane, holding that Rick abandoned her and did not remedy his abandonment within
reasonable time.1130 The supreme court thus affirmed termination of parental rights over
both children.1131
Veselsky v. Veselsky
In Veselsky v. Veselsky, 1132 the supreme court held that a mother was entitled to
retain primary physical custody of children after moving to another state,1133 that a
mother’s student loan was properly included as a marital debt in the division of property
upon divorce,1134 and that a father was properly ordered to pay seventy-five percent of
costs for visitation and medical expenses.1135 Bernard and Patricia Veselsky shared
custody of their children until Patricia planned to move to Minnesota with her children
and sued for full custody.1136 Bernard appealed the decisions of the trial court to grant
both primary custody of the children and an unequal division of property to Patricia.1137
The supreme court allowed primary custody to Patricia under the best interests of the
child standard, considering factors including: legitimate reasons for the mother’s move,
ability to meet the children’s needs, household stability, and the maintenance of a close
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relationship with the non-custodial parent.1138 The supreme court allowed an unequal
distribution of marital property because Patricia’s student loan was obtained during the
marriage and must applied as joint debt and because her unemployment while she
pursued her degree is a substantial income disparity.1139 The supreme court affirmed the
decisions of the trial court both in granting full custody to Patricia and in awarding
unequal property division.1140
Ebertz v. Ebertz
In Ebertz v. Ebertz,1141 the supreme court held that the superior court did not err in
awarding sole custody of two children to a mother and shared custody of a third child to
both parents.1142 After a custody hearing, the superior court granted custody of two of
Denise Bahma-Ebertz and Peter Ebertz’s children to Denise and granted shared custody
of their third child to both of them.1143 The supreme court ruled that the superior court
adequately addressed the statutory factors for determining the children’s best interests1144
and that the record supported the superior court’s decision.1145 The supreme court also
held that the superior court properly rejected the custody investigator’s recommendations
because the court properly relied on other evidence.1146 The supreme court affirmed ,
holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion and its findings were not
clearly erroneous.1147
Ray v. Ray
In Ray v. Ray,1148 the supreme court held that the superior court had jurisdiction to
require a father to pay child support for an illegitimate son for whom he had previously
agreed to pay support.1149 During divorce proceedings, James Ray established that he
was not the biological father of C.R.1150 After the divorce proceedings, however, James
voluntarily filed documents with the court listing C.R. as his child and filed a motion
seeking monthly payments for his support obligations.1151 The superior court then
entered an order requiring James to pay child support for C.R.1152 Later, James filed a
1138
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motion claiming that the support order was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and sought retroactive relief.1153 The supreme court affirmed the denial of retroactive
relief, holding that the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the support
order because the documents filed by James could be interpreted as an agreement to pay
child support regardless of paternity.1154
Andrea v. David
In Andrea v. David,1155 the supreme court held that the superior court erred by
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before placing a child in an uncle’s home when the
custody decree granted the father physical custody.1156 The divorce decree between
Andrea and David granted physical custody of all four children to David.1157 However,
two of their children were placed in separate homes indefinitely, and one child was
subsequently placed in an uncle’s home over Andrea’s objections.1158 The supreme court
reasoned that, because the order had withdrawn the right of physical custody of one of the
children from the person granted custody, the order had modified the original custody
decree.1159 Holding that an evidentiary hearing is required any time a custody decree is
modified over the objection of a parent, the supreme court vacated the order and ordered
a hearing.1160
Jeff A.C. v. State
In Jeff A.C. v. State,1161 the supreme court held that the due process clause of the
Alaska Constitution does not grant a parent an absolute entitlement to participate in an
adjudication hearing prior to a hearing to terminate parental rights.1162 The superior court
adjudicated Jeff C.’s daughter as a child in need of aid (“CINA”) with the mother and
putative father present.1163 A paternity test later revealed Jeff to be the father.1164 The
state then moved to terminate the mother’s and Jeff’s parental rights, and the superior
court ruled against Jeff.1165 The supreme court held that Jeff’s right to procedural due
process was not violated by his exclusion from the adjudication hearing.1166 The court
reasoned that the focus of CINA adjudication is the child, while the focus in a termination
1153
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proceeding is the parents’ actions.1167 Furthermore, the state did not fail to fulfill its
notice requirement for the CINA adjudication because Jeff could not be “found after
diligent efforts.”1168 The court also upheld the superior court’s finding that other
requirements for termination were met.1169 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s termination of Jeff’s parental rights,1170 holding that parents do not have an
absolute right to participate in an adjudication hearing before a termination hearing.1171
Alyssa v. State, Department of Health and Social Services
In Alyssa v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,1172 the supreme
court held that a mother was not entitled to a jury trial in child in need of aid (“CINA”)
proceedings and the mother could be required to undergo a pre-adjudication
psychological evaluation.1173 The superior court denied Alyssa’s request for a jury trial
in proceedings to adjudicate whether her daughter was a CINA.1174 The superior court
also ordered that Alyssa undergo a pre-adjudication psychological evaluation.1175 The
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s denial of Alyssa’s request for a jury trial
because child protection cases have historically been treated as matters of equity in
Alaska.1176 Additionally, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s order for
Alyssa’s pre-adjudication psychological evaluation because Alyssa’s mental condition
was in controversy and there was sufficient evidence to establish good cause for a
psychological evaluation.1177
Elton H. v. Naomi R.
In Elton H. v. Naomi R.,1178 the supreme court held that the factual findings
required by Evans v. McTaggart1179 for awarding custody to a non-parent applied to a
grant of shared physical custody of two children to their father and grandmother and that
a four-condition test applied in awarding custody to a non-party.1180 After Elton and
Naomi separated, Naomi’s mother, Arletta, helped raise their two children.1181 In Elton’s
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suit for custody, from which Arletta was dismissed,1182 the superior court awarded sole
legal custody to Naomi but shared physical custody to Arletta and Elton.1183 Elton
appealed, arguing that the superior court: 1) violated the Evans requirement of certain
factual findings before awarding custody to a non-parent,1184 2) abused its discretion in
awarding legal custody to Naomi,1185 and 3) improperly awarded custody to a non-party,
Arletta.1186 The supreme court held that: 1) awarding shared physical custody to a nonparent over a parent’s objections required the Evans finding of clear and convincing
evidence that the parent is unfit or that the child’s welfare requires non-parental custody,
which the superior court did not make;1187 2) the superior court did not abuse its
discretion in granting Naomi legal custody because Naomi’s inability to parent was based
on only temporary problems;1188 and 3) a trial court may grant custody to a non-party
only if a) the non-party consents, b) the order complies with Evans, c) the non-party
would have been entitled to intervene, and d) the parties had fair notice of the possibility
of such award.1189 The supreme court affirmed legal custody to Naomi, reversed the
order of shared physical custody, and remanded, holding that the Evans requirement
applied to orders of physical custody and that custody may be granted to a non-party only
if the four conditions are met.1190

Abood v. Abood
In Abood v. Abood,1191 the supreme court held that the trial court properly found
that a personal injury settlement was a wife’s separate property, that a home purchased by
the husband prior to the marriage was marital property, that the appreciation of the
husband’s business was marital property, that a federal income tax return was his separate
property, and the value of a car traded in by the wife was properly determined.1192
Patrick and Kimberly Abood divorced, and the superior court divided their property.1193
Both appealed the division of property.1194 The supreme court that Kimberly’s personal
injury settlement was her separate property even though it was deposited in a joint
account because of the personal nature of the settlement and its intended purpose to
provide for her future medical needs.1195 The court also held that the house Patrick had
1182
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purchased prior to the marriage was joint property because the house had served as the
marital home and both had contributed to its care and upkeep.1196 The court ruled that the
appreciation in Patrick’s business was joint property because it resulted from marital
contributions of time and money.1197 The supreme court also held that the superior court
did not err in finding the income tax refund was Patrick’s separate property because the
reduction of liability was the result of his contribution of separate funds.1198 Finally, the
supreme court held that the superior court properly valued the car Kimberly traded in by
using the Blue Book value at the time of trial.1199 Therefore, the supreme court affirmed
the superior court’s division of property with respect to the personal injury settlement, the
marital home, the business appreciation, and the tax refund.1200
Hansen v. Hansen
In Hansen v. Hansen,1201 the supreme court held that a valuation of a husband’s
corporation and primary residence were correct, there was no need to grant any postseparation payments, and any accounts funded either fully or at least in part by premarital
assets were not wholly marital assets.1202 Karl and Mada Hansen lived together for
nearly two years after filing for divorce.1203 The superior court divided the assets in
Mada’s favor.1204 The superior court held that the corporation was properly valued
according to valuation of goodwill.1205 The supreme court affirmed, holding that the
superior court correctly valuated the marital residence by valuing it within the range
presented by experts in the trial.1206 The supreme court held that post-separation
payments need not be awarded because the couple continued to live as a marital unit after
separation.1207 The supreme court held that retirement accounts held by Karl were not
marital property because the majority of funds in the accounts were premarital and there
was no showing of intent to transmute these accounts into marital property.1208 Finally,
the supreme court held that Mada’s health insurance benefit was in part a marital asset
because marital funds were partially used to fund the account.1209 The supreme court
reversed the property division with respect to Karl’s retirement accounts, vacated in
1196
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regard to Mada’s health insurance benefit, remanded in regard to those property issues,
and affirmed as to all other respects.1210
State, Department of Revenue v. Wallace
In State, Department of Revenue v. Wallace,1211 the supreme court held that the
Child Support Services Division (“CSSD”) may collect back child support payments if it
does not attempt to modify a pre-existing order for child support payments.1212 Wallace
was ordered to pay fifty dollars a month in child support while in prison.1213 The order
stated that the payments would increase after his release, but the CSSD did not to try to
increase his payments until seven years after his release.1214 The superior court ruled that
the payments could not be increased retroactively,1215 but the supreme court found that
the original order terminated upon Wallace’s release from prison.1216 Since no order
covered the period after Wallace’s release, the supreme court ruled that the CSSD was
not precluded from seeking higher payments for that period.1217 The supreme court
reversed the superior court’s decision, holding that, although the CSSD may not
retroactively modify a pre-existing order, it is not prevented from seeking back payments
for periods not covered by an order.1218
Webb v. State, Department of Revenue
In Webb v. State, Department of Revenue,1219 the supreme court held that a father
could not claim that his ex-wife was precluded from collecting child support payments
during the time when the children were in the custody of a third party.1220 Gary Webb
did not pay child support for the eight years during which one or both of his daughters
were out of the custody of Key, their mother.1221 After the children returned to Key,
Gary moved to modify the amount of arrears he owed, claiming that Key was precluded
from collecting payments from this time.1222 The superior court denied the motion, and
Gary appealed.1223 The supreme court held that the rule precluding arrearages when the
obligor exercises primary custody of the children could not be construed to allow
1210
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preclusion when the children were in the custody of a third party.1224 The court reasoned
that neither the plain language nor the policy of the statute supported this
interpretation.1225 The court also reasoned that Webb could have sought modification of
the order when the children were out of their mother’s custody, but retroactive preclusion
was impermissible.1226 The supreme court affirmed the judgment, holding that Webb
could not claim preclusion of the child support payments because he did not have
physical custody of the children.1227
State, Department of Revenue v. Wise
In State, Department of Revenue v. Wise,1228 the supreme court found an
administrative delay of nine months to be insufficient reason to change a presumptive
effective date for modification of a child support order.1229 Wise was served with a
Notice of Petition for Modification of Judicial Support Order after the mother of his child
applied for increased child support.1230 The complete review of Wise’s file took nine
months.1231 The superior court cited this delay as reason to change the effective date of
the modification.1232 The supreme court reversed, stating that the presumed effective date
for modification orders is the date of the initial Notice.1233 Although the superior court
may alter the effective date when it has good cause, a delay of nine months was not good
cause here.1234 The supreme court thus reversed the superior court’s decision, holding
that it had abused its discretion in changing the presumptive effective date based merely
on the length of the administrative review.1235
Killary v. Killary
In Killary v. Killary,1236 the supreme court held that a parent is not entitled to
child support payments when the child is no longer living with the parent unless there is a
factual showing that the parent incurred justifiable expenses relating to the child.1237
After Clifford and Susan Killary divorced, Susan was given primary physical custody of
their daughter Megan, and Clifford paid child support.1238 Megan ran away from home
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after the trial court denied Clifford’s motions to modify the custody arrangement, but
Clifford was still obligated by a superior court order to pay child support.1239 Clifford
appealed his child support obligation on the grounds that Susan was no longer in physical
custody of Megan and no longer was supporting her financially.1240 The supreme court
held that because child support should accurately reflect the responsibilities of the
parents, Clifford’s continuing support would only be justified based on a factual showing
that Susan was spending money to find Megan and to maintain a suitable residence for
her should she return.1241 Therefore, the supreme court held that Clifford’s child support
obligation should not have been reinstated without a factual determination of Susan’s
expenditures, and it vacated the superior court’s child support order and remanded the
case for the necessary factual determination.1242
Hixson v. Sarkesian
In Hixson v. Sarkesian,1243 the supreme court held that an exchange-rate
fluctuation is not income for the purposes of determining whether a material change in
circumstances has occurred when determining child support payments.1244 Sarkesian
lived in Switzerland and was paid in Swiss Francs.1245 Hixson moved to modify
Sarkesian’s child support, contending that exchange rate fluctuations altered Sarkesian’s
child support obligation by over fifteen percent—the threshold for a presumption of
material change in circumstances.1246 The superior court, in denying the motion held that
the change was lower than the fifteen percent threshold.1247 The supreme court reversed
and remanded, holding that child support payments must be calculated consistently and,
per the settlement agreement, be based on the applicable percentage of income in dollar
terms.1248
Hanson v. Hanson
In Hanson v. Hanson,1249 the supreme court held that in a divorce proceeding,
increases in a business’s value were marital property and that an award of interim support
and attorneys’ fees may offset a spouse’s share of the marital estate.1250 Hans Manson
acquired a company before the marriage to Michelle and subsequently allocated five
1239
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percent to her.1251 The superior court held that this company was Hans’ separate
property.1252 On appeal, the supreme court held that the doctrine of active appreciation ,
under which increases in value of a business resulting from marital conduct was marital
property if 1) the property appreciated during marriage; 2) parties made marital
contributions; and (3) the contributions caused the appreciation.1253 The court held that
there was evidence that the company in dispute satisfied all three, and therefore the court
remanded for findings under the doctrine.1254 The supreme court thus reversed the
superior court’s decision that the business was separate property.1255
Bartlett v. State, Department of Revenue
In Bartlett v. State, Department of Revenue,1256 the supreme court held that due to
the exceptions to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, when a state that has issued an order
in a child support registration proceeding retains jurisdiction, an order from another state
does not have preclusive effect.1257 Bartlett, a former Alaska resident, was ordered to pay
child support.1258 After his obligations had ended, the Child Support Enforcement
Division still sought back payments from him by registering his obligation in Arizona,
where Bartlett said he lived.1259 The Arizona court denied the registration order because
he was not properly served when the division sent mail to him at his Michigan
address.1260 The Alaska Superior Court vacated the support order, and Bartlett’s ex-wife
appealed.1261 The supreme court held that an exception to the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, based on the limited scope of a decision and the limited jurisdiction of a court,
applies to child support registration cases.1262 The court reasoned that responding states
cannot modify child support orders of issuing states if a party continues to reside in the
issuing state.1263 The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that the Arizona
court’s determination that Bartlett was not properly served should not be given issue
preclusive effect.1264
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XIII. IMMIGRATION LAW
Ninth Circuit
United States v. Zavala-Mendez
In United States v. Zavala-Mendez,1265 the Ninth Circuit held that an alien who
proceeds directly to a border station in the manner designated by the government and
presents himself to authorities cannot be convicted of being “found in” the United
States.1266 Zavala-Mendez was convicted of being “found in” the United States when he
tried to enter Alaska at a border crossing in a car after having previously been
deported.1267 He appealed.1268 The Ninth Circuit held that “found” implies that the alien
was discovered by someone else and did not voluntarily present himself.1269 The court
reasoned that an alien, who crosses the border, proceeds along the designated path from
the border to the customs inspection station, and presents himself to the authorities, is
analogous to an alien who disembarks from an airplane and proceeds to the inspection
counter; such aliens have not been “found in” the United States.1270 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that an alien who proceeds in a designated manner to a border station
and presents himself to authorities cannot be convicted of being “found in” the United
States.1271
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XIV. INSURANCE LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Graham-Gonzalez
In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Graham-Gonzalez,1272 the supreme
court held that an insurer may offer uninsured and underinsured motorists (“UIM”)
coverage without stating the differences in cost between levels of UIM coverage in the
application form.1273 Graham-Gonzalez was seriously injured in a car collision; her
insurance company, Government Employees’ Insurance Company (“GEICO”), paid the
full UIM policy limits.1274 Graham-Gonzalez sued GEICO to obtain compensation
beyond the policy limits, claiming she should have been informed of the relatively
modest cost in obtaining more UIM coverage.1275 The supreme court reversed, holding
that GEICO did not violate Alaska law by failing to explain the different costs in varying
levels of UIM coverage1276 because the relevant statute did not mandate how insurers
should inform customers of the different costs1277 and because the legislative history only
suggested insurers must make such differences in prices available and give customers
notice of their availability.1278
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Dowdy
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Dowdy,1279 the supreme court
held that questions relating to the types of claims covered by an insurance policy were
beyond the scope of an arbitration clause regarding fault and liability.1280 Dowdy sought
to compel arbitration on the question of whether separate coverage limits applied to
different claims arising from an automobile accident.1281 Although the insurance policy
only provided for arbitration on the questions of fault and liability, Dowdy claimed that
the issue of coverage is inextricably intertwined with those questions.1282 Reasoning by
analogy to case law concerning arbitration clauses in business contracts, the supreme
court held that an otherwise nonabitrable matter is inextricably intertwined with an
arbitrable matter, and therefore capable of being committed to arbitration, when findings
on the matter committed to arbitration would decide the otherwise nonarbitrable
1272
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question.1283 Because an arbitrator’s determination of fault and liability would not
necessarily resolve questions of coverage, the matters were not inextricably
intertwined.1284 The supreme court held that an insurance policy clause providing for
arbitration of matters of fault and liability did not extend to the question of which claims
are covered by the policy.1285
Dugan v. Atlanta Casualty Companies
In Dugan v. Atlanta Casualty Companies,1286 the supreme court held that an
automobile insurance policy did not cover relatives of the insured who are not residents
of the insured’s household.1287 Dugan attempted to collect for his automobile-related
injuries as a covered person under his son’s automobile insurance policy with Atlanta
Casualty Companies, which claimed that Dugan was not covered.1288 The superior court
held that the policy required claimants to reside in the policyholder’s household and that
Dugan was not a resident in his son’s household.1289 Dugan appealed, arguing that the
policy’s residency provision was ambiguous and should be interpreted against the insurer
and that the superior court incorrectly applied the reasonable expectations test—or
whether the insured reasonably expected that a claimant is a resident in his household—
in determining that he was not a resident in his son’s household.1290 The supreme court
held that ambiguity is determined by looking to the parties’ reasonable expectations,
which are discerned from: 1) language of the disputed provision, 2) language of other
provisions, 3) relevant extrinsic evidence, and 4) case law on similar provisions.1291 The
court also held that Dugan’s interpretation of the policy was not reasonable and that
therefore the residency requirement was not ambiguous.1292 The supreme court also held
that the superior court correctly applied the reasonable expectations test.1293 The supreme
court thus affirmed judgment in favor of Atlanta Casualty Companies, holding that the
policy did not cover relatives who were not residents of the insured’s household.1294
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XV. NATIVE LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Alaska Inter-Tribal Council v. State
In Alaska Inter-Tribal Council v. State,1295 the supreme court held that the
superior court correctly rejected a group of Alaska Natives’ equal protection claims
because the Natives did not prove that a de jure discriminatory law enforcement program
existed and did not prove any discriminatory intent or purpose.1296 The Natives sued the
state, alleging that Alaska’s allocation of law enforcement services unconstitutionally
disadvantaged residents of “off-road,” mostly Native, communities.1297 The superior
court granted summary judgment against the Natives’ federal equal protection claims,
and the state-based equal protection claims were rejected after a bench trial.1298 The
supreme court held that the lower court neither erred in finding that the state did not
adopt the federal government’s pre-statehood de jure race-based law enforcement
program1299 nor erred in finding that on-road and off-road communities were not
similarly situated.1300 Finally, the supreme court held that the superior court’s rejection
of state-based discrimination claims after trial rendered harmless any error in dismissing
pre-trial identical federal claims because the state constitution provided at least as much
protection as the federal.1301 Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s judgment denying the Natives’ equal protection claims.1302
In re Adoption of Sara J.
In In re Adoption of Sara J.,1303 the supreme court held that prevailing social and
cultural standards do not govern good cause determinations under the Indian Child
Welfare Act (“ICWA”), but they remain relevant if the good cause inquiry raises
questions about the suitability of a statutorily preferred placement.1304 Matilda W., a nonNative, petitioned to adopt three sibling Native children.1305 The superior court granted
custody for “good cause” over the objections of the children’s extended Native family
and tribe, who were statutorily preferred under ICWA.1306 They appealed, arguing the
good cause inquiry must be governed by the Native community’s social and cultural
1295
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standards.1307 While ICWA gives a preference for child placement with extended family
or other Natives, a court may deviate from these preferences if there is good cause.1308
The supreme court held that while prevailing social and cultural standards are necessary
considerations in the preference inquiry, Congress did not intend to require them in the
good cause inquiry.1309 The court held that although not controlling, such standards are
still relevant if a good cause determination implicates a preferred placement.1310 The
supreme court affirmed, holding that prevailing social and cultural standards do not
control good cause determinations under ICWA but remain relevant if the inquiry
implicates preferred placement.1311
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XVI. PROPERTY LAW
United States Supreme Court
Alaska v. United States
In Alaska v. United States,1312 the Supreme Court of the United States held that
Alaska did not have title to two areas of submerged land, one beneath the Alexander
Archipelago and the other beneath the Glacier Bay.1313 After a Special Master
recommended summary judgment for the United States, Alaska filed exceptions claiming
that the Alexander Archipelago waters are either historic inland waters or a juridical bay,
and, with respect to the lands beneath the Glacier Bay, the United States had not rebutted
the presumption that Alaska received title at statehood.1314 The Supreme Court held that,
while states have presumption of title to submerged lands under inland waters,1315 the
Alexander Archipelago waters were not historic inland waters because Alaska failed to
show that the United States exercised authority over the area continuously by excluding
foreign vessels of innocent passage1316 and not a juridical bay because the waters lack
physical features allowing a mariner to perceive a bay’s limits.1317 The Supreme Court
also held that the United States has rebutted the presumption that title to submerged lands
beneath the Glacier Bay passed to Alaska at statehood by showing that it clearly intended
to set these lands aside for the Glacier Bay National Monument, a federal reservation.1318
Thus, the Supreme Court overruled all of Alaska’s exceptions, holding that the United
States had title to the land.1319
Alaska Supreme Court
ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. State, Department of Natural Resources
In ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. State, Department of Natural Resources,1320 the
supreme court held that certain corporations were not entitled to a discovery royalty—a
reduction of the rate of lease royalties owed to the State by oil companies that make the
first commercial discovery of oil in a geographic structure.1321 ConocoPhillips was
denied a special discovery royalty rate by the Commissioner of Natural Resources on the
premise that the reservoir belonged to a known geographic structure.1322 The supreme
1312
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court held that where an agency’s decision incorporates factual findings and is supported
by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed.1323 The supreme court further held that
procedural due process violations by the Commissioner were not significant enough to
warrant reversal.1324 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s holding,
finding that denial of discovery royalties was supported by substantial evidence and did
not violate the lease or Alaska law.1325
North Pacific Processors, Inc. v. City and Borough of Yakutat
In North Pacific Processors, Inc. v. City and Borough of Yakutat,1326 the supreme
court held that the trial court’s ruling that disputed items were “structural improvements
and additions” was not clearly erroneous within the meaning of a lease.1327 The lessee,
North Pacific Processors, Inc., added compressors and other equipment to a property for
the operation of its fish processing plant.1328 After the lessee decided not to renew its
lease, the lessor, City and Borough of Yakutat, sought injunctive and declaratory relief to
prevent the lessee from removing the equipment, claiming that the lease contained a
purchase option for these items.1329 The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s ruling
that the disputed items were subject to the lease purchase option because they were
“structural improvements and additions.”1330 However, the supreme court reversed the
trial court’s ruling that the price of the equipment should be determined by the lessee’s
internal depreciation schedule and remanded the case for proper valuation.1331
Tufco v. Pacific Environmental Corp.
In Tufco v. Pacific Environmental Corp.,1332 the supreme court held that a lessor
was estopped from enforcing a hazardous waste provision, was required to pay costs and
fees, and the lower court properly declined to amend the lessor’s complaint.1333 Tufco
leased a building to Pacific Environmental Corp. (Penco).1334 The lease prohibited Penco
from using the property to store hazardous materials.1335 While doing so, Fisher arranged
and participated in a cleanup that required the storage of hazardous materials on the
leased property.1336 Tufco later sued to evict Penco for storing the materials.1337 The
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superior court concluded that Tufco was estopped from enforcing the provision given
Fisher’s conduct.1338 Tufco moved to amend its complaint to include an allegation that
the lease had been modified, but the court denied the motion and awarded Penco fees and
costs.1339 Tufco appealed.1340 The supreme court held that the record supported a finding
of estoppel because Fisher’s participation in the cleanup qualified as an “assertion” that
Tufco would not enforce the hazardous materials provision, Penco reasonably relied on
the assertion, this reliance resulted in prejudice, and justice required enforcement of the
estoppel.1341 The supreme court held that the superior court properly declined to allow
amendment of the complaint because the issue of modification had not actually been
raised or litigated.1342 The supreme court also held that the lower court properly
interpreted and applied the lease’s provision allowing prevailing-party costs and fees. 1343
The fees award was proper because the lease’s provision should have been understood to
include all attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing the contract, not just those incurred after
the complaint was filed.1344 Similarly, the costs award was proper because the lease did
not limit the recoverable costs to those incurred after the action was filed.1345 The
supreme court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in holding that Tufco was
estopped from enforcing the provision and required to pay costs and fees because the
record supported a finding of equitable estoppel, the lower court properly declined to
amend the complaint, and the costs and fees were proper under the terms of the lease.1346
Cook Schuhmann & Groseclose v. Brown & Root
In Cook Schuhmann & Groseclose v. Brown & Root,1347 the supreme court held
that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale was fair and reasonable even when the trustee delayed
the auction1348 and that an offer of judgment made before the parties exchange
disclosures was not premature with respect to an award of attorneys’ fees.1349 Following
default on a deed of trust, Brown & Root, the trustee, conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure
sale of the property.1350 The auction was delayed four hours to allow two prospective
bidders time to obtain the cash and certified checks required to bid.1351 After Cook filed
suit claiming the sale procedures were not fair and reasonable, but before the parties had
1337
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made disclosures, Brown & Root served an offer of judgment that Cook rejected.1352
Citing precedent that foreclosure sales will only be set aside as unfair or unreasonable in
cases that reach unjust extremes,1353 the supreme court reasoned that Cook actually
benefited from the delay in the auction because of the possibility of higher bids.1354 The
supreme court held that the delay in the foreclosure sale was not unfair or
unreasonable1355 and that an offer of judgment need not be made after disclosures to
support an award of attorneys’ fees.1356
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XVII. TORT LAW
Ninth Circuit
Berg v. Popham
In Berg v. Popham,1357 the Ninth Circuit held that a company who designed and
installed equipment that led to the release of hazardous that could have arranger liability
under Alaska’s strict liability for release of hazardous substance statute.1358 The Norge
Corporation designed and installed dry cleaning equipment for Berg.1359 This equipment
released hazardous substances, and Berg was strictly liable for its cleanup costs.1360 Berg
sued Norge’s successor in interest for contribution.1361 After certifying questions with
the Alaska Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that arranger liability requires “actual
involvement” in a decision to dispose of waste.1362 The court further held, however, that
under this approach a successor can be liable even if he does not own, have authority to
control, or a duty to dispose of the hazardous waste, if it manufactures, sells or installs a
useful product that is intended to direct a hazardous substance into a sewer system.1363
Thus, there could be sufficient evidence to impose arranger liability against Norge.1364
Alaska Supreme Court
Berg v. Popham
In Berg v. Popham,1365 the supreme court held that arranger liability could attach
to a party that makes, sells, or installs a useful product that purposely directs hazardous
substances into the environment even when the party does not own, possess, have
authority to control, or have a duty to dispose of the hazardous substance. 1366 Berg, a dry
cleaner operator, was held liable for the release of a hazardous substance into the
environment and sought contribution on an arranger liability theory from the franchising
company that installed and leased the equipment that released the substance.1367 The
supreme court held that the useful products exemption does not apply where the essential
function of the product involves the release of a hazardous substance into the
environment.1368 As a result, the supreme court held that arranger liability extends to a
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party involved in the decision of the disposal method of hazardous substances, even if
that party does not own, possess, have authority to control, or have a duty to dispose of
the substance.1369
Lowell v. Hayes
In Lowell v. Hayes,1370 the supreme court affirmed summary judgment of a claim
of defamation, holding that there was no showing of actual malice, that a public figure
could not obtain declaratory relief for defamation and that attorneys’ fees must be paid to
the prevailing party because the final judgment was more favorable to the public figure
than the initial settlement offer.1371 Lowell was a member of a committee formed to
further the consolidation of the governments of a local borough and a city.1372 Lowell
was accused by the city’s mayor, Hayes, of falsely purporting that he had followed
inappropriate procedure in petitioning for a special election for consolidation.1373 The
supreme court held that the statements were not based on actual malice because the
dispute between Lowell and Hayes was based on a subjective interpretation of the
procedural rules.1374 The supreme court also held that Lowell could not obtain
declaratory relief because the law offers a public figure neither substantive nor
declaratory relief to seek coercive remedies for non-malicious defamation.1375 Finally,
the supreme court held that Lowell was required to compensate Hayes for attorneys’ fees
because the final judgment was more favorable to Hayes than Lowell’s offer.1376 The
supreme court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in all respects.1377
Ondrusek v. Murphy
In Ondrusek v. Murphy,1378 the supreme court held that the issue of respondeat
superior liability was a question of fact for the jury.1379 Locke, a guide for Chilkoot
Horseback Adventures (“Chilkoot”) took his parents, the Ondruseks, for a horseback ride
on a day when Chilkoot was closed.1380 Locke’s mother was injured and sued Chilkoot
under the theory of respondeat superior.1381 The Ondruseks filed for summary judgment,
claiming that there was no issue of material fact regarding the respondeat superior
1369
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liability.1382 The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and the jury found
for Chilkoot.1383 The supreme court affirmed the denial of summary judgment and held
that the issue of respondeat superior liability was a question of material fact for the jury
because there was an issue as to whether Locke acted within the scope of his
employment.1384
Guerrero v. Alaska Housing Finance Corp.
In Guerrero v. Alaska Housing Financial Corp.,1385 the supreme court held that
summary judgment was granted in error against the Department of Transportation and
Public Facilities (“department”) because issues of material fact existed regarding whether
the department negligently breached an operational duty to post no-crossing and advancewarning signs at an intersection.1386 A five-year-old child was hit by a car and severely
injured while crossing a street near the low-income housing development in which he
lived.1387 His family sued the department for negligence in design, construction and
maintenance of the intersection.1388 The supreme court held that under a qualified
immunity exception, the department could be held liable for negligence arising out of
operational decisions, which included the exercise of due care in ensuring proper
roadway signage.1389 The court held that the Guerreros had established a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the department was negligent and as to whether the alleged
negligence was the proximate cause of injury.1390 As such, the supreme court reversed
the order granting summary judgment on the Guerreros’ negligent signing claim against
the department and remanded the case for further proceedings.1391 The court affirmed the
summary dismissal of all other claims.1392
Jones v. State, Department of Corrections
In Jones v. State, Department of Corrections,1393 the supreme court held that it
was harmless error for the superior court to dismiss a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED) when the same damages were recovered on an alternative
theory of wrongful termination1394 and that it was proper to deny recovery and award
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attorneys’ fees when the jury award was less than a rejected settlement offer.1395 Jones
received a memo containing racial and sexual slurs, informing him that he had been
terminated as a prison barber.1396 Jones sued the state for IIED and wrongful
termination.1397 The superior court dismissed Jones’s IIED claim on summary
judgment.1398 Jones then refused a settlement offer and proceeded with his human rights
act claim.1399 The jury found for Jones, but in an amount less than that of the settlement
offer.1400 Thus, the superior court awarded costs and attorneys’ fees to the state.1401 On
appeal, the supreme court affirmed and found that it was harmless error to dismiss the
IIED claim because recovery for the same damages was won on the alternative claim of
wrongful termination.1402 Further, the supreme court held that it was proper to deny
recovery and award attorneys’ fees because Jones rejected a settlement offer for a higher
amount.1403
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XVIII. TRUSTS AND ESTATES LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Clement v. Fulton
In Clement v. Fulton,1404 the supreme court held that a lower court did not clearly
err in rejecting an argument that a cancer patient would only have lived for one year if
correctly diagnosed and allocating wrongful death proceeds accordingly.1405 Fulton died
only days after a hospital failed to diagnose her with leukemia due to a blood test mixup.1406 Fulton’s children sued the hospital, which agreed to settle for $500,000.1407
However, the parties could not agree on an allocation of the funds between Fulton’s
children and husband.1408 The superior court allocated a disproportionate share of the
settlement to Fulton’s husband based on his expected years of dependency on Fulton.1409
On appeal, Fulton’s daughter, Clement, argued that the trial court erred in finding that
Fulton had a life expectancy of more than one year based on unsworn medical reports.1410
Based on independent review of the reports, the supreme court affirmed the allocation,
holding that because the trial court did not clearly err in rejecting the assertion that Fulton
would have only lived one year even if correctly diagnosed.1411
In re Estate of Maldonado
In In re Estate of Maldonado,1412 the supreme court held that a surviving spouse’s
wrongful death proceeds should not be included in a decedent’s augmented estate.1413
After the death of her husband, Maldonado sought to collect her elective share of her
husband’s estate, but the superior court offset Maldonado’s elective share by the
wrongful death settlement she received after her husband’s death.1414 The supreme court,
however, ruled that the wrongful death proceeds are not property owned by the surviving
spouse at the time of the decedent’s death.1415 Therefore, the supreme court reversed the
superior court, holding that wrongful death proceeds should not offset a surviving
spouse’s elective share.1416
1404

110 P.3d 927 (Alaska 2005).
Id. at 929.
1406
Id.at 928–29.
1407
Id.at 929.
1408
Id.
1409
Id.
1410
Id. at 930.
1411
Id. at 929.
1412
117 P.3d 720 (Alaska 2005).
1413
Id. at 729.
1414
Id. at 722.
1415
Id. at 729.
1416
Id.
1405

107

Enders v. Parker
In Enders v. Parker,1417 the supreme court held that a personal representative who
sought to invalidate a decedent’s will was properly denied recovery of attorneys’ fees and
costs from the estate because she had not acted in good faith.1418 Enders unsuccessfully
challenged her stepfather’s will.1419 The superior court subsequently found Enders had
not acted in good faith, and therefore denied the recovery of fees and costs from the
estate.1420 Enders appealed.1421 The supreme court held that good faith required Enders
to act in the best interests of the will’s successors, and a rebuttable presumption of good
faith would have arisen if Enders had reasonably arguable grounds for her claim.1422
However, the court held that surviving summary judgment did not establish that
reasonably arguable grounds existed, as the proper inquiry was whether there was a
reasonable chance of success at trial.1423 Further, the absence of sanctions against
Ender’s attorney did not have any bearing on the finding of Ender’s lack of good faith.1424
Moreover, it was within the discretion of the trial court to decide whether to hold an
evidentiary hearing or accept additional evidence to determine whether Enders acted in
good faith.1425 The supreme court affirmed the denial of fees and costs, holding that the
superior court did not clearly err in finding a lack of good faith.1426
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